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The Incoherent Justification for Naked Restraints of 
Competition: What the Dental Self-Regulation Cases 
Tell Us About the Cavities in Antitrust Law 
Peter C. Carstensen* 
“Under the Sherman Act a combination formed [solely] for the 
purpose . . . of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing . . . 
price . . . is illegal per se.”1 
“[A] ‘naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive 
justification . . . .’”2 
 
There is an inescapable inconsistency between the general rule that naked 
(cartelistic) restraints of competition are per se illegal and the treatment of 
such restraints when engaged in by self-regulatory professional 
organizations, standard setting organizations, and various private 
organizations that regulate competition in variety of athletic and other 
activities. Most observers believe that some of that cartelistic regulation may 
be not only socially and economically desirable but also necessary to serve 
the public interest. The judicial effort to explain when cartels or other naked 
restraints on competition within or between such groups and others are 
lawful and when they are not has floundered on the lack of specificity of the 
“rule of reason” which invites linking any justification for a restraint to 
some ambiguous assertion of “reasonableness.” The inevitable implication 
is that any cartel could be lawful if it were reasonable and served some “pro-
competitive,” “consumer welfare,” or other “public interest” goal. This 
 
* Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am deeply 
indebted to Anthony Gray for insights in the distinction between real ethical issues and the common 
use of the term to describe regulation. Similarly, my colleague Alta Charo has instructed me on the 
important distinctions between regulation of economic conduct by professionals and the 
establishment of standards for the substantive performance of a professional activity. Darren Bush, 
Harry First, Chris Sagers, and Spencer Weber Waller read an earlier draft and greatly assisted me 
in understanding the challenges that my approach faces. I particularly want to single out Professors 
Sagers and Bush for their extended comments and questions. I presented a revised version of this 
paper at the 19th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium at which I gained further quite helpful 
comments from Rebecca Haw Allensworth and Melissa Maxman as well as the attendees. Finally, 
Erik Eisenheim has proved reliable and helpful research assistance on this project. 
1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
2. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)). 
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Article contends that this approach is wrong. Instead, what courts are in fact 
doing is preempting certain kinds of restraints from antitrust law review, 
although this is evident only by implication. This Article applies the 
Carstensen-Roth framework to explain such preemption or exemption. Three 
elements are necessary: state law, federal law, constitutional law, or some 
generally accepted public interest goal must authorize the organization to 
regulate some aspect of the market, the regulation at issue must be within 
the scope of that authorization, and the process used to adopt and implement 
the regulation must be appropriate under the circumstances. Naked 
restraints satisfying these elements are exempt from antitrust law review, 
and courts applying antitrust law should not undertake to determine the 
substantive “reasonableness” of such regulations. This framework adheres 
to the general rule that naked restraints of competition are always per se 
illegal unless exempt and provides a clearer basis for determining when and 
whether a restraint can be lawful. The three Supreme Court decisions 
reviewing FTC challenges to conspiracies among dentists to restrict and 
regulate competition in dental care provide the basis to illustrate and test 
this approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organized groups of dentists have gone to the Supreme Court three 
times in the last thirty years to defend naked, cartelistic restraints on 
competition within and between their profession and alternative services. 
They have lost twice and won once. In 1986, the Court upheld an FTC 
challenge to the Indiana Federation of Dentists agreement among its 
members to refuse to provide information to insurers necessary to review 
claims for dental services.3 But in 1999, it rejected the FTC’s effort to 
condemn the California Dental Association’s cartelistic restrictions on 
advertising by dentists.4 Then in 2015, the Court again embraced an FTC 
challenge and condemned the North Carolina Dental Board’s collusive 
suppression of competition from third parties.5 Thus, a decision of a trade 
association to suppress competition among its members is arguably 
lawful, but a comparable association of dentists cannot agree with each 
other to boycott insurers nor can a state agency undertake to restrict the 
practice of dentistry by non-dentists without active supervision by the 
state! The logic of these distinctions is not transparent. All three of these 
agreements are indistinguishable from traditional cartels that antitrust law 
otherwise consistently condemns as per se illegal. 
These dental cases are part of a larger set of professional regulation 
cases that the Court has decided. Those decisions seem to create a 
similarly confusing pattern of liability. Consulting engineers cannot 
forbid price competition but may impose other “ethical” standards on 
their members.6 Bar associations cannot fix fees or otherwise regulate 
competition unless they have the authorization of some supervising state 
authority and the restraint serves some “public interest aspect” of the 
profession.7 Confusingly, even when a public authority has approved a 
restraint on advertising competition that restraint can still be 
unconstitutional.8 Yet if an association of professionals imposes a similar 
advertising restraint it can be lawful.9 Similarly, doctors have an express 
exemption from antitrust law to police the quality of the work done by 
 
3. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 447–48 (1986) (finding unlawful collusion to 
withhold x-rays from insurers). 
4. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 757 (holding collusion to suppress advertising of discounts or 
quality could be lawful). 
5. N.C. Dental Bd. of Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 494–95 (2015) (finding collusive 
suppression of competition from non-dentists subject to antitrust and forbidden because it is not 
shielded by state action immunity). 
6. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (“Ethical norms may 
serve to regulate and promote this competition [within the learned professions] and thus fall within 
the Rule of Reason.”). 
7. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788–89 n.17 (1975). 
8. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977). 
9. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 759. 
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other doctors except that they cannot use that authority without some 
outside, active supervision over their decisions.10 All these restraints are 
essentially cartelistic combinations that justify themselves as regulation 
of professional conduct. In other contexts, cartelistic combinations are 
per se illegal regardless of the justification offered. Thus, usually 
cartelistic conduct is held per se unlawful but sometimes it is 
“reasonable” and so lawful. 
Despite the apparent lack of consistency in these outcomes, they reflect 
an implicit logic that is also observable in a variety of other comparable 
areas where exemptions from, or preemptions of, antitrust law are at 
issue. But the flawed nature of conventional antitrust categories and their 
inappropriate uses11 has obscured the potential coherence of this 
unarticulated framework and has led advocates and judges into using 
terms that do not adequately describe the analytic process being used. As 
a result, some decisions are highly questionable. This is especially true 
with respect to the implicit assertion that courts and agencies have the 
right and capacity to decide the merits of the substantive terms of 
regulatory regimes as a matter of antitrust law. Moreover, the apparent 
acceptance of some cartelistic restraint as “reasonable” and so lawful 
creates a serious inconsistency with the antitrust doctrine of per se 
illegality for cartels. 
At the outset, then, it is central to recognize that the three dental cases 
and the bulk of the other professional and similar cases involve claims of 
a right to regulate economically significant conduct involving market 
participants not otherwise engaged in any joint productive activity. This 
differentiates these cases functionally from situations in which the parties 
to a restraint are engaged in a legitimate, productive joint venture or are 
in the process of transferring some good or property from one to the other. 
In such cases, the legitimate needs of the transaction define what 
restraints, ancillary to that transaction, may be lawful. This distinction in 
the functional relationship between the restraint and the other activities 
of the parties is central to having a coherent and logical framework for 
 
10. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1988). Indeed, beyond the professions, the NCAA 
restrains competition among colleges for the services of “student-athletes,” and standard setting 
organizations may impose a variety of restraints in the form of standardization. See, e.g., O’Bannon 
v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the right of the NCAA to regulate payments 
to college athletes); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510–11 (1988) 
(holding the National Fire Protective Association is authorized to set safety standards but must 
employ appropriate process to do so). 
11. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008) (explaining while categories historically were 
helpful, their meanings have shifted and are now manipulated by companies to get the outcome 
they desire). 
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evaluating restraints.12 However, as the foregoing discussion 
demonstrates, not all naked restraints are necessarily illegal. So, while the 
naked/ancillary distinction is central, antitrust law needs to have a 
principled way to explain when and on what terms a naked restraint of 
completion might be lawful. 
Unfortunately, contemporary antitrust has evolved a broad “rule of 
reason” that in some cases ignores the functional distinction and has as 
its ultimate criterion an open-ended, ad hoc balancing of potentially 
positive and negative effects of restraints. This approach has historical 
doctrinal roots dating back to a dissent in the earliest restraint of trade 
case.13 It also relies on the shift of antitrust theory from a focus on 
protecting the market process to an assessment of the consequences of a 
restraint. If the contribution to “consumer welfare”—itself an undefined 
and undefinable term14—exceeds the harm to consumers, then the good 
outweighs the bad and the restraint is reasonable. But cartels are generally 
illegal regardless of their effect on consumer welfare, and this still 
dominates much of antitrust.15 This results in a lack of consistency in the 
resulting antitrust standards or a coherent explication of the basis of those 
decisions that do assess the “merits” of naked restraints. However, if one 
looks at the specific issues that recur in the cases involving preemption 
of antitrust by regulation, a set of implicit criteria and standards exist. 
The thesis of this Article is that these apparently deviant decisions 
involve the question of whether otherwise per se unlawful conduct is 
exempt from antitrust law based on the regulatory authority of the actors. 
Alternatively, these results imply a preemption of antitrust law.16 This is 
especially problematic when that authority originates from a de facto 
 
12. The same basic analysis is applicable to the analysis of conduct by monopolists, but the 
elaboration of that point is best left to another day. 
13. See generally United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343–74 (1897) 
(White, J., dissenting) (contending that all restraints, including cartels, should be subject to a 
reasonableness test). 
14. Compare Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled? 18 
(2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law School Legal 
Scholarship Repository), available at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=2987&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/49MP-TESS] (acknowledging that 
competition law is concerned with harm to producers as well as consumers, concluded that “the 
word ‘consumer’ [in consumer welfare] . . . is a term of art”) with PETER C. CARSTENSEN, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A GLOBAL ISSUE 16–37 (2017) 
[hereinafter CARSTENSEN, COMPETITION POLICY] (critiquing the goal of consumer welfare). 
15. See generally United States v. Kemp & Assocs., 907 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2018) (rejecting 
the trial court’s use of rule of reason to decide a cartel case where defendants asserted significant 
efficiencies resulted from the naked restraint). 
16. The terms “exemption” and “preemption” are used interchangeably here as both mean that 
antitrust law does not apply to the underlying conduct.  
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authorization accorded to self-regulatory groups.17 A three-step 
framework of analysis explains and predicts the outcomes in many of 
these cases. It also can explain how courts in cases such as California 
Dental reached decisions that are questionable. To be sure, other frames 
of reference might still uphold the validity of even those restraints, but 
such frames create important risks for the integrity of competition law 
generally.18 In contrast, the per se legal framework explicitly recognizes 
that the specific regulations of a lawful regulatory regime are not 
appropriate subjects for antitrust review. Any such review necessarily 
would require the antitrust court to act as a regulator, but antitrust law 
provides no criteria for making such decisions. Other legal standards can, 
however, provide a basis for judicial review, but those do not involve 
antitrust law. In application, the per se legal framework would condemn 
almost all contemporary professional self-regulation that is not subject to 
supervision by a disinterested and effective agency of the state.19 
Part I of this Article expands on the two problems at the core of the 
misuse of the rule of reason in these cases. First, the contemporary 
understanding of the “rule of reason” is that it permits the justification of 
cartelistic restraints based on a balancing of their pro- and anti-
competitive effects. Second, the confused and ultimately incorrect 
equating of regulatory rules with ethics, as well as conflating economic 
regulation with standards for the actual practice of a profession, has 
reinforced the reliance on open-ended reasonableness as a criterion. 
Part II describes the per se legal analysis developed by Carstensen and 
Roth that utilizes a three-step analytic framework for understanding these 
cases.20 Part III examines in some detail the decisions in the three dental 
cases to show that substantively they all involved the question of 
exemption for otherwise naked, cartelistic restraints on competition. Part 
IV expands on the challenges that professional and other self-regulation 
present to antitrust law by contrasting the open-ended use of a 
“reasonableness” criterion and the standards that emerge from the per se 
 
17. Other important areas are standard setting organizations. See, e.g., Am. Soc. Mech. Eng’rs, 
Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). This includes the NCAA, which regulates college 
sports. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (“Since its inception in 
1905, the NCAA has played an important role in the regulation of amateur collegiate sports.”). 
18. See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2014) (suggesting that 
professional regulatory authorities not exempted by state action immunity be allowed to defend 
their regulations on their merits via a modification of the per se rule against cartels). 
19. As will be discussed infra, text accompanying notes 281–87, other contexts may require 
different methods of ensuring appropriate oversight of the regulations adopted and enforced by de 
facto regulatory entities. 
20. See Peter C. Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A 
[Re]conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 
349, 349–50 (2000) (detailing the framework). 
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legal framework. It also returns briefly to the unhelpful reliance on ethics 
and substantive standards in evaluating the merits of these cases as well 
as whether the distinctions between exclusion of competitors and restraint 
among competitors might be useful to distinguish the legality of the 
competitive effects of these regulations. Part V concludes with a 
reconsideration of challenges competition law faces going forward in 
evaluating various kinds of de facto regulatory restraints. 
I.  TWO PROBLEMS WITH CONTEMPORARY ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 
AFFECTING PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION RESTRAINTS 
This Part addresses two significant problems that confront antitrust 
law. The first is the contemporary use of an open-ended definition of the 
“rule of reason” that makes it the polar opposite of a rule. The second is 
the combination of the misuse of the term “ethics” to describe 
professional economic regulation and the failure to separate standards of 
practice from regulations related to the business practices of a profession. 
A.  The Ruleless Character of the “Rule” of Reason 
In 1897, in Trans-Missouri, Justice Edward White’s dissent argued 
that cartels should be evaluated for their “reasonableness” including the 
reasonableness of the prices they fixed.21 His view was that unless the 
prices were unreasonable, the restraint would be lawful. The majority 
rejected that position and instead employed the forerunner of the per se 
rule. A year later then-Judge William Howard Taft, writing for the Sixth 
Circuit, used the Addyston Pipe case to explicate and modify the Trans-
Missouri rule.22 The result was a central distinction between naked 
restraints and ancillary ones.23 The distinction is between an ancillary 
restraint whose function is to facilitate some other legitimate productive 
venture or transaction between or among the parties and a naked restraint 
whose function is to exploit market power. An ancillary restraint either 
 
21. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343–74 (1897) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
22. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899). 
23. This distinction has its origin in the common law of England, Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 
24 Eng. Rep. 347, 349; 1 P. Wms. 181, 185–88, and found its greatest and clearest articulation in 
then-Judge Taft’s opinion in Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 279–80. The centrality of the insight 
is universally acclaimed. Moreover, it provides the fundamental basis for Bork’s critique of 
antitrust. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 800–01 (1965); see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: 
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 272 (1986) (contending that the 
Sherman Act be read consistent with Addyston Pipe). For another effort to expand on this 
framework, see Peter C. Carstensen & Richard F. Dahlson, Vertical Restraints in Beer Distribution: 
A Study of the Business Justifications for and Legal Analysis of Restricting Competition, 1986 WIS. 
L. REV. 1, 17–29 (1986). 
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addresses some need to define and thereby restrain the relationship 
among the parties or controls a risk of opportunistic conduct by either 
party. As such, its reasonableness derives from its utility in serving the 
legitimate needs of a business transaction. If the restraint is unnecessary 
to protect those legitimate interests, it would necessarily be unreasonable. 
Similarly, if its competitive effect is excessive in comparison with other 
roughly equal alternatives, it is also unreasonable. 
A naked restraint only functions to create, allocate, or exploit market 
power. These are “cartelistic” restraints whether they restrict price, 
output, quality, or any other dimension of competition including entry 
into the market. All such restraints regulate the market in which they 
operate. They can control price, restrict output, allocate customers, 
constrain the variety of products, or limit promotion. In the usual 
industrial context, the underlying objective is to increase the gains to the 
parties directly, by exploitation, or indirectly, by restricting competition. 
Government regulations that impose licensing requirements, restrict 
market access, impose hours, or otherwise control the way in which 
competition will take place have an analogous function. When the 
government imposes such restraints, presumably the public interest is 
being served.24 Empirical analysis of the justification and effect of much 
regulation at the national, state, and local levels of government has shown 
that this presumption is not well founded in many cases.25 Moreover, 
even when there are legitimate reasons for regulations, it is frequently the 
case that the actual regulations provide unnecessary (“unreasonable”) 
protections for incumbents and unduly broad exclusion of competition. 
At one time, the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process 
allowed courts to look critically at the nature of regulatory restraints and 
determine whether they were “reasonable” or not.26 The doctrine has 
 
24. Public choice theory disputes this view by focusing on the economic incentives of those 
seeking to influence the regulatory process. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, 
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, at v 
(1962) (detailing the economic incentives); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302–03 (1974) (discussing how rent seeking is 
competitive and its effects). This theory is often used to explain the use of licensing. See, e.g., Paul 
J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 
210 (2016) (discussing public choice theory in licensing). 
25. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 24, at 302; Larkin, supra note 24, at 330; Marc T. Law & 
Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of 
Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723 (2005); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, 
Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1570 
(2017). 
26. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Alan Meese has argued that the 
Standard Oil decision embedded the Lochner substantive due process analysis in the rule of reason. 
Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2012). 
The analysis here rejects that characterization because it would accept the open-ended 
reasonableness standard. 
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proven unworkable in any consistent and rational way.27 As a result, the 
courts have had to stand back from an open-ended review of the merits 
of regulatory legislation and rules. This is not without its costs to the 
economy. 
There is a need for better general criteria for judicial review of the 
merits of regulatory regimes.28 However, where a more specific 
constitutional or statutory provision exists, courts can constrain 
legislative or administrative regulation.29 For purposes of this analysis, 
the central point is that courts have not developed the doctrinal tools that 
permit them to have a consistent critical analysis of regulatory statutes, 
ordinances, and rules that impose unreasonable requirements. This 
challenge also explains why antitrust law has as its core value that naked 
restraints are themselves inherently unreasonable (per se illegal). There 
is a burgeoning literature focused especially on occupational licensing 
that is seeking better standards.30 Those debates are beyond the scope of 
this discussion, except as the failure of direct oversight of regulation 
demonstrates why antitrust law is no better suited to make such 
judgements than is the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 
In analysis of naked restraints by antitrust, as with government 
regulation, there is no principled way to determine what is reasonable. To 
try to do so is for courts to  
[S]et sail on a sea of doubt, and . . . assume[] the power to say, in respect 
to contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration on 
either side than the mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint 
of competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.31 
In contrast, an ancillary restraint is amenable to a principled standard 
of review based on the legitimate needs of the transaction or venture. The 
 
27. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 514 (1934) (finding no basis in the due process 
clause for condemning provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law); City of New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (rejecting constitutional challenge to anticompetitive local regulation). 
28. See generally Peter C. Carstensen, Controlling Unjustified, Anticompetitive State and Local 
Regulation: Where Is Attorney General “Waldo”?, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 771 (2011) [hereinafter 
Carstensen, Where Is Attorney General Waldo] (discussing the problem of creating standards for 
review of unnecessarily anticompetitive local and state regulations). 
29. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (rejecting a broad prohibition 
on lawyer advertising based on the First Amendment); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 
543, 556–57 (1951) (holding interstate commerce considerations overcame local grant of monopoly 
for transferring travelers among Chicago rail stations); County of Milwaukee v. Williams, 732 
N.W.2d 770, 788 (Wis. 2007) (finding a local ordinance that excluded taxis from meeting pre-
arranged passengers at an airport violated state law requiring open access by businesses to airports). 
30. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 26–
27 (1976) (explaining why occupational licensing should seek a higher standard); Law & Kim, 
supra note 25 (discussing occupational licensing); Larkin, supra note 24, at 210 (calling for the 
Supreme Court to intervene to protect the public from the excess of occupational licensing). 
31. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 
U.S. 211 (1899). 
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analysis is applicable to any restraint if the proponents engage in some 
legitimate, productive transaction or venture. Establishing the validity of 
that venture provides the basis to determine whether the parties face the 
need to define some element of the transaction or address some risk of 
opportunistic behavior by a mutually agreeable restraint. Given proof of 
that need, the next question is whether the specific restraint at issue 
functions to resolve that need or risk. Finally, if there is a less restrictive 
way to accomplish the same goal, then the specific restraint is 
unreasonable as it imposes excessive burdens for which there is no 
offsetting benefit. This four-step process can be demanding in application 
and so the courts have in practice employed presumptions that limit the 
need to go the full analysis. 
From 1897 to 1912, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases 
involving restraints of trade. It upheld some. Those cases involved 
restraints that were prima facie ancillary to some legitimate venture or 
transaction.32 Those it condemned were naked, cartelistic restraints, 
except arguably Northern Securities in 1904.33 That case involved a 
merger resulting in a monopoly on railroad services across the northern 
United States, from Minnesota to Washington. While the four-justice 
plurality seemed to rest its decision on a categorical rejection of any 
combination among competitors, the crucial fifth vote came from a 
justice who focused on the lack of actual integration produced by the 
holding company and its subsidiaries as evidenced by the profit 
distribution scheme based on the activities of the underlying railroads 
rather than on earnings of the entire enterprise.34 Cases after Northern 
Securities followed the same pattern of rejecting cartels and subjecting 
potentially ancillary restraints to a more nuanced test to determine 
reasonableness.35 
 
32. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898) (joint venture to provide services 
to cattle buyers at a stockyard included restraints on members conduct held lawful); Hopkins v. 
United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (joint venture to provide services to brokers at a stockyard 
included restraints on members conduct held lawful). 
33. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 356 (1904). 
34. See id. at 360–64 (Brewer, J., concurring); see also Peter C. Carstensen, Lost in (Doctrinal) 
Translation: The Misleading Retelling of the Supreme Court’s Antitrust Decisions on Restraints of 
Trade, 62 S.M.U. L. Rev. 525, 536–39 (2009) [hereinafter Carstensen, Lost in (Doctrinal) 
Translation] (discussing Northern Securities). 
35. See Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 426 (1908) (condemning Shawnee 
Compress’ use of leases to exclude competition and entrench a monopoly); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374 (1911) (holding minimum resale price restrictions 
invalid). The opinion following earlier reviews of resale price maintenance in over the counter 
pharmaceuticals held the restraint unlawful. But it did so because the defendant’s justification for 
the restraint was that it furthered the interest of retailers in suppressing competition. That is, it was 
naked restraint for the benefit of the retailers. See Carstensen, Lost in (Doctrinal) Translation, supra 
note 34, at 536–39; James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 305, 360 (1989). 
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In Standard Oil and American Tobacco, Chief Justice White formally 
embraced a “rule of reason” under which the two monopolies were 
condemned as unlawful under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.36 Many commentators and courts believe that these 
decisions adopted White’s earlier expansive view of reasonableness.37 
But in one of the few lucid passages in those opinions, White stated that 
this rule of reason accepted the correctness of Trans-Missouri.38 The 
implication, often ignored, is that naked restraints are inherently 
unreasonable. Subsequent decisions in the 1920s reinforced the 
conclusion that naked restraints were illegal per se.39 There were some 
apparent or actually deviant decisions in that period as well.40 But the 
core distinction survived and was reinforced strongly in the Socony 
 
36. See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911). 
37. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 58 (2d ed. 
2009); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK 192 (2000) (“White’s majority opinion . . . , because it also made reasonableness the 
fulcrum, is sometimes said to have retreated from holdings in Trans-Missouri and Joint-Traffic . . . 
[because of] Justice White’s use of language borrowed from his dissent in the earlier case[s] . . . .”); 
see also ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 55–56 (5th ed. 
2003) (noting that the doctrine in this period, 1890 to 1911, was internally inconsistent and illogical 
literal formalism). 
38. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 66–69; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 179. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 394 (1927) (holding that an 
agreement between 80 percent of the sanitary pottery manufacturers and distributors to fix and 
maintain uniform prices violated the Sherman Act); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 
371, 389 (1923) (invalidating the practices of the linseed oil industry that required companies to 
share intimate details of their internal affairs through a so-called bureau); E. States Retail Lumber 
Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612–13 (1914) (lumber retailers illegally conspired 
to prevent wholesale retailers from selling directly to consumers). 
40. See Nat’l Ass’n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403, 413 (1923) 
(upholding a naked production allocation agreement among manufacturers to limit demand for 
labor which was later interpreted as an example of the labor exemption); Bd. Of Trade of City of 
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (upholding restraints on nighttime trading) This 
decision is commonly understood to have facilitated some kind of price fixing among traders. But 
see Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade 
Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade Analysis, 15 RES. L. & ECON. 
1, 3 (1992) [hereinafter Carstensen, The Hollow Core of Antitrust] (demonstrating that the restraints 
were ancillary to the operation of the commodities market and had no demonstrable effect on the 
commissions traders could earn). See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 
(1933) (overturning an injunction against a joint venture to market coal that planned to set prices 
for the products sold). This venture is generally recognized to have had the goal of the organization 
a cartel plan for the coal industry, but the specific case did not provide clear evidence of that 
unlawful intent. 
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decision.41 Indeed, the Court has consistently condemned cartels as “the 
supreme evil of antitrust . . . .”42 
Unfortunately, the naked-ancillary distinction was largely lost on 
antitrust jurisprudence until revived by the early work of Robert Bork.43 
As a result, the decisions in the period from 1914 to the later 1970s lacked 
any clear definition of the criteria for reasonableness or when exactly a 
per se rule attached. Because of Bork’s general hostility to most restraint 
of trade decisions, mainstream scholars and practitioners tended to 
downplay the centrality of the ancillary concept even after he highlighted 
its relevance.44 In BMI, the Court came close to restoring some analytic 
clarity, including citing Addyston Pipe, but ultimately failed to provide a 
full statement of the standard.45 
In part, the use of presumptions of legality and illegality with respect 
to potentially ancillary restraints inhibited a fuller statement of the 
underlying theory. Indeed, since forward-looking contracts by definition 
involve restraints on the freedom of one or both parties, the federal 
judiciary would be overwhelmed if every such restraint were subject to 
full blown antitrust inquiry. In such cases, the challenger must 
demonstrate that serious competitive concerns exist.46 For example, this 
presumption of legality applies to vertical restraint cases generally 
 
41. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (“Thus for over 
forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-
fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called 
competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be 
interposed as a defense.”). 
42. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
43. See Robert H. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 
211 (1959) (suggesting the importance of ancillary restraints to the application of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division (pt.1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 800 (1965) (“The modem law generally holds naked or 
non-ancillary agreements fixing prices or dividing markets illegal without more, as Taft thought 
the law should, but his attempt to establish a category of lawful ancillary restraints has had much 
less success.”); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 377, 383–84 (1966) (distinguishing “naked” as opposed to 
“ancillary” restraints). 
44. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 927, 949 (2016) (discussing the lack of courts and commentators willing to analyze and 
balance competitive effects). 
45. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (quoting United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)) 
(“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they 
are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.”).  
46. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1265, 1293 (“[M]ost courts have disposed of Rule of Reason cases on the ground that the 
plaintiff failed to prove a significant anticompetitive effect . . . .”); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of 
Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009) 
(finding most rule of reason cases fail because the challenger does not establish that there is 
sufficient harm to competition to warrant further review of the merits of the restraint). 
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because prima facie there is a transaction to which the restraint 
presumptively is ancillary.47 Moreover, as at least one subsequent case 
has shown, there can be a narrow definition of ancillarity that leaves some 
restraints facially internal to a venture subject to a rule of reason even if 
not “ancillary.”48 However, the underlying analysis would be identical to 
the ancillary restraint analysis if the presumption of legality for such 
internal restraints were rebutted.49 
On the other hand, there is also a “quick look” that creates a 
presumption of illegality against certain, usually horizontal, restraints 
because prima facie they appear unlikely to be reasonably ancillary to the 
legitimate productive transaction or venture in which the parties are 
participating.50 But such restraints can still be lawful if necessary for the 
legitimate needs of the parties.51 As will be evaluated later in this 
discussion, the term “quick look” has also applied to the question of 
whether a private regulatory restraint was exempt from antitrust law, 
further confounding the meaning of the concept. 
Further complicating the analysis of restraints, a series of decisions 
eliminating the older per se rules condemning vertical restraints failed to 
articulate a coherent standard by which such restraints might be judged.52 
 
47. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (upholding 
geographic restraints on retailer location as part of revised plan of marketing). The assumption of 
ancillarity in that case is questionable. See generally Peter C. Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and 
the Schwinn Doctrine: Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 771 (1976). 
48. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (“[T]he ancillary restraints doctrine has no 
application here, where the business practice being challenged involves the core activity of the joint 
venture itself—namely, the pricing of the very goods produced and sold . . . .”). Despite this 
holding, the opinion did not reject the application of the rule of reason to such a restraint if it was 
in fact unreasonable. See Peter C. Carstensen, Using Dagher to Refine the Analysis of Mergers and 
Joint Ventures in Petroleum Industries and Beyond, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 447, 466–67 
(2007) (extrinsic facts combined with the lack of an articulated justification for the restrictive 
agreements suggest that the restraints may well have facilitated tacit collusion in the pricing of 
gasoline). 
49. See Carstensen, supra note 48, at 455–56 (noting that the distinction of “ancillary” restraints 
requires stricter review for external restraints compared to the strong presumption of validity for 
internal restraint). 
50. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (a joint venture 
to produce a recording could not restrain competition from potential substitute recordings not part 
of the venture); Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 836 (6th Cir. 2011) (restrictive terms in 
joint venture agreement on listing properties for sale were unreasonable), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 
942 (2011). 
51. See Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (upholding a horizontal 
price fixing agreement among independent music copyright owners as “necessary” to their joint 
marketing venture). 
52. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“[T]he 
rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would be the appropriate standard to judge vertical 
price restraints.”); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733–34 (1988) 
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Indeed, the initial decision in this line—Continental TV—ended with the 
conclusion that “the appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason 
that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.”53 As lower courts 
subsequently observed, this left extreme uncertainty as to what the 
standard might be.54 Certainly some of the opinions of the Court in this 
period suggested that an open-ended inquiry into the merits of a restraint 
regardless of its function was appropriate.55 
The binary nature of the per se/rule of reason dichotomy reflects the 
poverty of antitrust doctrinal language. Given two categories and a need 
to do a more refined analysis, any decision involving a nuanced analysis 
is included in the open-ended rule of reason category.56 This results in 
the kind of situations on which this Article focuses. 
Not only do some scholars contend that certain cartels are 
economically desirable and so should be lawful but a few judges 
themselves have reached similar conclusions.57 That some naked 
restraints should be upheld on their merits as lawful under the antitrust 
laws as a result of a rule of reason balancing approach creates a serious 
conflict within antitrust doctrine: which cartels can defend themselves on 
the grounds that they create on balance some benefit and which are not 
so empowered?58 There is no principled way to explain when or how 
 
(reinforcing the rejection of a need for vertical per se illegality and horizontal per se illegality 
symmetry); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1977) (overruling a previous case which had 
decided that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of that statute); Cont’l T.V., 433 
U.S. at 57–58 (overruling the per se rule established in Schwinn).  
53. Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 9. 
54. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing that the Sylvania rule provides limited guidance as to rule of reason application). 
55. See Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 361–362 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(recommending a more “discerning” approach, given that there are instances of legal price-fixing). 
56. Another example of this confusion involves the exchange of information among 
competitors. Such conduct may not restrain competition, but it may also facilitate either tacit or 
express collusion. In the latter case, the exchange is part of a naked restraint of competition and 
should be unlawful. In the former, there is no restraint express or implied and so there can be no 
violation because despite the agreement, the absence of restraint means the agreement by definition 
does not affect competition. 
57. See United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:16–CR–00403–DS, 2017 WL 3720695 
(D. Utah Aug. 28, 2017), rev’d, 907 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Roger D. Blair & D. 
Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 495 (2012) (“The cartel agreement or merger to monopoly that creates a 
bilateral monopoly results in an increase in total surplus and, therefore, would seem to survive a 
rule of reason test where the goal is total welfare. . . . From the perspective of total welfare, a 
horizontal agreement or a merger to monopoly is desirable.”). 
58. See, e.g., Kemp & Assocs., 2017 WL 3720695 (applying rule of reason to a cartel that 
claimed it achieved economic efficiencies), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Kemp & 
Assocs, Inc., 907 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2018) (advising the trial court to reconsider its decision that 
the rule of reason applies to a cartel). Recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit confirm that naked 
restraints are per se illegal. See United States v. Sanchez, 760 F. App’x 533, 536 (9th Cir. 2019) 
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courts can or should draw this line.59 The burden on any party 
challenging a cartel should be to prove that the cartel has had on balance 
an unreasonable effect. But how could courts consistently resolve that 
question since by definition a naked restraint restricts competition in 
some way? Requiring such proof in general in cartel cases would, of 
course, greatly weaken or even destroy antitrust law. It is for this reason 
that the contemporary “rule of reason” approach in the professional self-
regulatory context is wrong and an existential threat to the integrity of 
antitrust doctrine. There is, however, a different path consistent with the 
overall structure of antitrust law to provide a principled basis for 
reviewing the legality of specific regulations, even when adopted by 
groups without formal state or federal authority to regulate economic 
activity. Explaining that path is the goal of this Article. Recognition of 
that path calls into question the contemporary adherence to White’s early 
version of reasonableness. 
B.  The Role and Relevance of “Ethics” and Substantive Standards in 
Professional Regulation 
The term “ethics” appears frequently in the professional cases. The 
implication, never clearly articulated, is that professionals need to have 
stricter standards of ethics that in turn manifest themselves in restraints 
on competitive conduct. The term ethics is inherently ambiguous. It can 
mean the duty to obey the rules applicable to the relevant activity. 
Alternatively, it describes the process of choosing among several ways to 
proceed, the overall best choice is the ethical one where there are 
significant harmful potentials that can affect some participants in the 
process. Further complicating the underlying set of challenges facing 
professionals is the need for standards as to the actual practice of the 
profession. The existence and interaction of these considerations, when 
combined with the lack of a clear doctrinal category for the review and 
 
(rejecting application of the rule of reason to a naked bid-rigging conspiracy); United States v. 
Guillory, 740 F. App’x 554, 556 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding the rule of reason inquiry does not apply 
to per se illegal agreements). An older example is found in United States v. Brown University, 5 
F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993), where the Third Circuit remanded a case involving a cartel among Ivy 
League schools to fix discounts for the lower court to consider the various “good thing” defenses 
that MIT offered. Not surprisingly, MIT choose to settle the case at that point by accepting the 
consent decree that its fellow conspirators had already accepted. Meanwhile, Congress exempted 
some kinds of information sharing among college financial aid officials from antitrust law, but not 
the kind of egregious collusion that had existed. 
59. See, e,g., Robert Connolly, The End Is Near for the Per Se Rule in Criminal Antitrust 
Prosecutions (Mar. 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3356731 [https://perma.cc/G53R-6Z3P] (arguing that the per se rule must 
fail because it violates the Sixth Amendment and denies the defendant the right to argue that its 
conduct was not an unlawful restraint). 
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evaluation of professional self-regulatory decisions, explain in a 
significant way the underlying confusion in the case law. 
1.  The “Ethics” as Regulation and as Moral Choice 
The dental cases all use ethics as an alternative term for regulation.60 
Indeed, this is a common use of the term. What is at issue in these cases 
is who will regulate various aspects of the profession, especially with 
respect to issues of competition. This use of “ethics” most notably in the 
NCDB decision reflects an underlying premise that professional 
organizations have some inherent right to regulate the practice of 
professionals in the field.61 
It is helpful to distinguish the use of “ethics” to describe regulatory 
questions from the ethical issues that involve choices among alternative 
ways to deal with a situation. These choices require deciding among 
legally permissible alternative actions, which affect others. Moreover, if 
the issue recurs with some regularity that the choice may become more 
imbedded in practice. This can make such ethical responses look more 
like regulations. But the central difference is that these ethical responses 
address the substantive conduct of the professional in delivering 
professional services where there are alternative responses. 
It is often the case that actors facing such dilemmas turn to third parties 
for advice and counsel. The Institute for Global Ethics (IGE) was one 
such entity.62 It provided both specific counseling and training to help 
individuals and entities better respond to such ethical issues. According 
to IGE’s former CEO, Anthony Gray, the goal of good ethical decision-
making is to have a process that is both procedurally fair and is seen as 
fair and reasonable by all stakeholders so that the resulting decisions are 
accepted even if they are contrary to the interest of the party concerned.63 
In a very rough outline, the desired process is transparent, explainable, 
repeatable, and defendable. The process should narrow and focus the 
issue to clarify the interests at stake and likely results.64 The process itself 
rests on some core values that IGE believes are widely shared around the 
 
60. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 512 (2015) (using the terms 
“ethical” and “self-regulation” within the same paragraph, demonstrating how the two terms are 
conflated by even the Court). 
61. Id. 
62. The Institute closed in late 2019. The work of Rushworth Kidder provided the theoretical 
basis for its approach. See RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, HOW GOOD PEOPLE MAKE TOUGH CHOICES 
(1995). For information generally see, James E. Nalen, Institute for Global Ethics, 6 J. BUS. FIN. 
LIBRARIANSHIP at 73 (2001). 
63. Interview with Anthony Grey, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Global Ethics (May 23, 
2018) (on file with author). 
64. These criteria mirror those of ancillary restraint analysis, but that is because good decision-
making should involve these characteristics regardless of the goals being served. 
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world among people of very different cultures, backgrounds, and goals. 
This kind of ethical decision-making is quite distinct from the rule-
oriented commands on how to conduct business that are central to the 
professional self-regulation cases. 
Thus, in a genuine ethical case, the question is what an individual or 
entity should do regardless of what others might do or wish. Thus, there 
is no “conspiracy” among those who reach similar ethical conclusions 
because each is acting unilaterally. Moreover, the focus of such ethical 
considerations is on the conduct or decisions of the actor involved. 
Hence, decisions intended to exclude third parties from the market or 
facilitate collective exploitation would fall outside the framework of 
ethical decision making. To be sure, a conclusion that certain parties or 
practices present a risk to the public interest might be a plausible basis to 
advocate for a state regulation that limited such conduct. 
Many justifications for professional licensure and limits on the scope 
of practice for specific types of professionals, such as nurses or dental 
hygienists, invoke claims based on the need to protect patients or clients 
from harm. Such regulations are often characterized as involving ethical 
issues. This is not descriptively useful. The purported regulatory rationale 
is that the risks of allowing such individuals to provide certain types of 
service generally outweighs the potential benefits. Much scholarship has 
focused on the validity of these assertions. While there is a plausible basis 
for some professional licensure and for limits on the scope of what a 
licensed professional, especially one with a subordinate status, may do, 
the more general finding is that the contemporary regulations largely 
serve to restrict competition, entrench more dominant classes of 
professionals, and exploit patients and clients.65 Again, the complexity 
of separating the genuine public interest benefits from the public choice 
manipulation of the legal regimes is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
it is not the task of antitrust law to review the merits of regulations. 
In sum, the assertion that the regulations at issue in the professional 
self-regulation cases involve ethical choices is not a helpful way to frame 
the issue. In fact, it obscures the claim of regulatory authority and its 
exercise. This is most evident in the CDA and NCDB decisions, as they 
addressed the merits of the specific restraints implemented by their 
respective organizations to restrict advertising or exclude competition. 
 
65. See Ryan Nunn & Gabriel Scheffler, Occupational Licensing and the Limits of Public 
Choice Theory, 4 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 25, 29 (2019) (legitimate reasons exist for licensing 
many occupations, but the evidence shows that in many cases it is either unnecessary or excessively 
restrictive). 
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2.  Substantive Standards of Practice66 
A second important distinction is that between regulation of the 
business practices of professionals and the establishment, and 
enforcement of standards for substantive practice of the profession. In 
some fields, such as medicine, there are a wide range of sources for 
standards including the National Institutes for Health, discipline specific 
professional organizations, and third-party advisory groups that 
recommend best practices. Unlike regulations aimed at protecting the 
economic wellbeing of professionals or specifying how they should 
compete in the market, these standards set forth the way in which the 
professional ought to provide the professional services. Different 
constellations of professionals often have different standards for 
performing the same medical task. Moreover, there can be overlaps 
among the skills of related clusters of medical professionals leading again 
to different standards for treatments. 
Other professions may have fewer differences. Accountants have a set 
of standards that they generally are expected to adhere to in conducting 
audits.67 Lawyers have a generally consistent set of professional 
standards governing relationships with clients, conflicts of interest, and 
related issues. Many of these standards are adopted and enforced through 
public agencies often relying on professional expertise.68 
The failure to adhere to substantive standards gives rise to malpractice 
claims. The concern is neither exploitation nor exclusion. It is that the 
professional failed to perform the services in the manner that they should 
have been provided. Here, the test is the merit of the standard based on 
the supporting scientific or professional consensus about acceptable 
practice. Such standards usually do not command or control when and 
how professionals compete in the market to sell their services. But if they 
should have that impact, then they should have antitrust review to 
determine whether the economic impact was the unavoidable incident to 
the adherence to the substantive standard. 
 
66. I am much indebted to my colleague, Professor R. Alta Charo, for educating me about this 
topic with particular reference to the practice of medicine. 
67. The SEC oversees the Financial Standards Accounting Board that that establishes the 
generally accepted accounting principles that all accountants must employ. See Daniel Schwarcz, 
Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 191, 234–35 (2018) 
(explaining the delegation of authority from the agency). 
68. At the oral argument in NCDB, Justice Breyer opined that he would prefer that the state 
authorize brain surgeons to set the standards for who can practice that skill. See Nina Totenberg, 
Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Teeth Whitening Case, NPR (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/10/14/356177201/supreme-court-hears-arguments-in-teeth-whitening-
case [https://perma.cc/CGY4-DGCY] (noting a preference for brain surgeons over bureaucrats for 
deciding licensing). 
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It is important to distinguish regulations governing the scope of 
practice from the standards describing or prescribing how to perform 
particular procedures. A professional will not commit “malpractice” 
based on violation of a scope of practice regulation69 even if such conduct 
may lead to administrative sanctions. Scope of practice rules often serve 
to restrict the economic opportunity of professionals, such as dental 
hygienists and nurses, by excluding them from providing services for 
which they have the necessary skill and training.70 As with licensure 
generally, overcoming the undesirable and unnecessary adverse effects 
of these rules raises a host of complex considerations.71 
Professional certification is a special case. The process of credentialing 
requires an enterprise that itself provides services and evaluations of 
individuals. Hence, it functions to produce specialized information that 
has economic value to both users and those being credentialed. The 
competitive concern is that such activities tend to result in a gateway 
control over access to the credential, which means that the credentialing 
enterprise is a monopoly. While it makes sense to have a professional 
certification system to ensure that those offering specific types of service 
have the training and continuing education necessary (but not sufficient) 
to practice the professional skill, such gatekeeping is distinct from setting 
a standard on how a service is to be performed. As Justice Breyer opined, 
we probably prefer that brain surgeons decide who ought to be a brain 
surgeon rather than a hospital administrator or a political appointee.72 
Nevertheless, the gatekeeper function of certification requires oversight 
when such certification is essential to access to the market or retention of 
ones position in that market. Thus, unlike regulation, certification 
restraints that either exclude alternatives or exploit those needing 
certification can fit into conventional rule of reason analysis comparable 
to that used in evaluating other types of monopolistic conduct. 
The central point of this section is that the complexity of setting 
standards for many aspects of professional services requires careful 
analysis of the function and role of the specific standard or regulation. 
Standards provide guidance to professionals and their customers as to 
how the service should be performed. Such regulations usually have at 
best only an indirect impact on competition. Certification is the result of 
 
69. The classic illustration of this fact is the tort case of Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 199 
(1926), where the chiropractor could not be found to be negligent merely because he violated that 
statute restricting the practice of medicine to MD doctors. 
70. See Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to 
Reporting Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 313–15 (2019) (noting that these 
restrictive practices also do not improve patient outcomes). 
71. See id. at 336–52 (discussing the inadequacy of various proposed reforms for healthcare 
provider licensing). 
72. Totenberg, supra note 68. 
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a productive enterprise but raises more difficult and challenging issues 
when a single enterprise controls admission to professional practice and 
so has the capacity to exploit or exclude. 
II.  THE PER SE LEGALITY MODEL 
As demonstrated in Section I.A, American antitrust law rests on a 
fundamental distinction between restraints that are ancillary to legitimate 
productive business ventures or transactions, and those that are the result 
of a naked, cartelistic restraint on competition that creates, allocates, 
and/or exploits market power. Purely naked restraints have no external 
benchmark for a court to assess the justification for and reasonableness 
of the restraints.73 In Addyston Pipe, Taft observed: “[T]here is no 
measure of what is necessary . . . except the vague and varying opinion 
of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought 
to be allowed to restrain competition.”74 For this reason, the Second 
Restatement of Contracts holds that any such contract is void and 
unenforceable.75 Thus, neither contract law nor antitrust law provides a 
basis to evaluate the merits of such restraints. As a result, most cartels are 
per se illegal, but courts have refused to condemn some. Most of these 
cases involve a cartel that is subject to oversight by a public agency.76 
These cases in effect apply some form of preemption based on state or 
federal law or constitutional provisions.77 However, some cartels 
including the NCAA, standard setting organizations, and some 
professional self-regulatory organizations are not subject to such 
supervision.78 
 
73. Seeking the “intent” of the parties will not provide a consistent basis for evaluation because 
it is very likely that putative public interest claims will mask anticompetitive intent. 
74. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899). 
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §187 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (contracts that 
involve only naked restraints are not valid contracts). Deeper tensions may exist between contract 
law and antitrust law’s presumption of legality where the contract is lawful in contract terms but 
unlawful in antitrust terms. The converse is also a potential outcome. See generally Mark A. Glick, 
Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A 
Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2002). 
76. See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 52 (1985) (allowing 
trucking companies to collude on prices based on state supervision); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers 
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (lack of active supervision resulted in 
rejection of state effort to authorize minimum prices). 
77. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007) (considering 
whether the antitrust claims conflicted with federal securities law). The labor exemption is 
comparable as well because the NLRB provides oversight and the statutes specify the scope of 
lawful bargaining. 
78. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing how an 
agreement restricting compensation of college players is not subject to any oversight by a public 
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The question then becomes what factors explain why some cartels can 
be legal, but the vast majority is not. The more transparent cases involve 
express exemptions from antitrust law found in federal statutes,79 
constitutional protections,80 and state action immunities.81 These are 
basically situations in which some non-public entity has authority to 
regulate some aspect of market conduct, preempting standard antitrust 
jurisdiction.82 Such regulation is inherently anticompetitive in the sense 
that it forecloses the ability of those regulated to engage in otherwise 
economically rational conduct. Harder to explain are the cases involving 
naked restraints on competition imposed by professional self-regulatory 
organizations, standard setting entities, and entities in a range of other 
activities, from college athletics to quarter horse shows, which are either 
upheld or condemned on their merits after a “rule of reason” inquiry that 
compels the courts to set forth on the “sea of doubt.”83 
 
regulator); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988) 
(recognizing that the national fire safety council sets fire safety standards used by insurers, builders, 
state and local government but it is not subject to any public oversight); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (a private association’s regulation of advertising by dentists in California, 
not subject to state oversight, was not necessarily illegal). 
79. See generally PETER CARSTENSEN & CHRISTOPHER SAGERS, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW: FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW (2007). 
80. See, e.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961) 
(“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of 
course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”); United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (noting that the freedom to petition does not violate 
antitrust laws); Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 
(1993) (upholding the immunity for petitioner speech first identified in Noerr). 
81. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943) (upholding California state law 
permitting agricultural commodity price regulation); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 
U.S. 494, 503 (2015) (showing a dental regulatory agency required disinterested oversight of its 
decisions to qualify for state action immunity); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 
216, 224–25 (2013) (holding state-action immunity did not apply to hospital authorities making 
acquisitions that substantially lessen competition). 
82. A partial exception involves petitioning government which is constitutionally protected, but 
even then, sham petitioning conduct is not exempt from antitrust law. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972) (showing sham litigation can violate antitrust 
law). Other partial exceptions include the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 298 (2018), that 
exempts farm cooperatives from antitrust liability with respect to a limited set of activities. See, 
e.g., In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1152 (D. Idaho 2011) 
(showing that production limits are not within the scope of the exemption). 
83. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 776 (holding the California Dental Association 
could regulate advertising by its members); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 103 (1984) (affirming the NCAA right to regulate college athletics but restricting its scope); 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 497–98 (affirming the right of a trade association to 
create standards that excluded products from the market to ensure reasonable fire safety, but 
rejecting specific decisions based on bad and unreviewable process); Abraham & Veneklasen Joint 
Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 776 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding right of association 
to establish standards that excluded cloned horses from registration). 
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In 2000, Carstensen and Roth proposed a framework to explain this 
group of antitrust cases that all involved some form of exemption of 
anticompetitive, usually cartelistic, conduct.84 Based on the methods 
used to assess express exemptions, the conclusion is that the professional 
self-regulation, standard setting, and similar decisions all involved 
(implicitly) analogous questions of exemption from antitrust law based 
on regulatory authority and practice. This analysis identified a three-step 
framework that explains and predicts the outcome of these cases. 
Moreover, although courts do not overtly employ this framework, it is 
possible to identify when courts may have erred because they assumed 
the answer to one of those steps. This framework avoids the inherent 
ambiguity of labeling such an analysis as an application of the “rule of 
reason.”85 Such decisions would mean that a court applying antitrust law 
has held the substance of the conduct to be lawful in itself. But identical 
conduct is usually per se illegal. 
The first step is to establish that the actors have authority from statute, 
constitution, or public policy to impose some restraint on the market. The 
first two of these sources are relatively straightforward: Does some 
statute or constitutional provision authorize, expressly or by necessary 
implication, some non-public entity to regulate some aspect of 
competition? Most of the cases involve interpreting statutes or the 
constitution that arguably exempt conduct from standard antitrust 
analysis.86 The analysis can be complex, especially when the exemption 
is not explicit but nonetheless arguably necessary for the effective 
operation of the alternative regulatory scheme.87 Similar issues can arise 
in determining whether state legislatures intended to insulate specific 
activities from antitrust law.88 The basic question, however, remains 
straightforward. 
A more difficult issue arises when the source of authority comes from 
a non-legislative or constitutional “public policy.” Without the standard 
 
84. Carstensen & Roth, supra note 20. 
85. The method laid out in the following paragraphs is analogous to the ancillary restraint 
analytic framework laid out in Addyston Pipe but uses distinct criteria. 
86. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1961); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664–65 (1965). 
87. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007) (holding that 
securities law implicitly precludes the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct alleged in this 
case); cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
(rejecting antitrust challenge to exclusionary conduct because of the capacity of the FCC and New 
York PSC to provide effective regulation of this conduct). 
88. Compare Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (state authorization 
of tying the provision of water and sewer service to annexation included an implicit authorization 
of the anticompetitive effects and so was within the state action exemption of antitrust law) with 
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 227 (2013) (holding the state action 
exemption did not apply to hospital authority acquisitions even though authorized by state law). 
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legislative or constitutional markers, courts appear to rely on intuition 
about such grants. In the case of the NCAA, the Supreme Court 
recognized that its establishment responded to a public demand for 
regulation of college athletics with respect to safety, rules of the game, 
and preservation of a distinct class of athletic programs.89 Many scholars 
dispute this characterization and contend that the NCAA is a “joint 
venture” among colleges to produce college sports.90 The limited 
function of the NCAA, particularly with respect to football, is to regulate 
a limited number of aspects of college sports. These regulations have no 
relationship to any putative joint venture. Indeed, Part VI of the opinion 
in dicta explicitly recognized the authority of the NCAA to regulate 
specific elements of college sports.91 The false assertion of a legitimate 
productive joint venture reflects an effort to fit the manifest authorization 
of powers to the NCAA into Taft’s naked-ancillary framework. The 
better understanding is that the NCAA has authority to regulate college 
athletics. 
Similar delegations of regulatory authority exist with respect to various 
sports associated with the Olympic Games and other international 
competitions.92 The global regulator of swimming determines who can 
compete in events around the world and controls access to the 
Olympics.93 The world tennis association regulates where contests can 
occur and who can participate.94 The quarter-horse association has the 
right to define the characteristics of such horses although the association 
was not a joint venture.95 Another “association” has the right to approve 
 
89. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 89, 102, 117–21 (acknowledging the NCAA’s “historic role in the 
preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics”); see also JOHN J. MILLER, 
THE BIG SCRUM: HOW TEDDY ROOSEVELT SAVED FOOTBALL 193–204 (2011) (reviewing the 
origin of the NCAA in response to regulatory concerns over the safety of college football); Peter 
C. Carstensen & Paul Olzowka, Antitrust Law, Student Athletes, and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope 
and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545 (1995).  
90. See, e.g., Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College 
Athletes? An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 375, 388 (1987) (“The 
fact that restrictions on players are needed may only prove the existence of ancillary or incidental 
restraints necessary for the success of the joint venture.”). 
91. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117–21. 
92. See, e.g., Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 899 F.3d 712, 713 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(describing how the Olympic Committee has exclusive jurisdiction over all US Olympic 
participation). 
93. See Lieff Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser & Co-Counsel Announce Elite Swimmers, Pro Swimming 
League, Sue FINA Over Antitrust Violations, LIEFF CABRASER CIV. JUST. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2018), 
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/2018/12/lieff-cabraser-co-counsel-announce-elite-swimmers-pro-
swimming-league-sue-fina-over-antitrust-violations/ [https://perma.cc/K5RL-ETWY]. 
94. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 2010). 
95. Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 776 F.3d 321, 325 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (noting that this group only regulates which horses qualify as quarter horses). 
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and regulate “official” rodeos.96 These cases illustrate that regulatory 
authority does not require explicit legislative approval. 
Professional self-regulation preceded the emergence of formal state 
regulation. The Supreme Court pointed to this history as providing a basis 
to claim a regulatory authority for such entities that is separate and 
distinct from any regulation that the states provide.97 In context of the 
North Carolina Dental Board case, the Court did not have occasion to 
consider the continued validity of such authority when the state has 
created a statutory system to provide oversight of the profession. 
However, the Court had earlier observed that a private group engaged in 
a naked restraint of competition cannot excuse its conduct by reference 
to a goal of implementing a state law.98 Certainly, in other contexts the 
Court has explicitly rejected claims that the underlying goal of a naked 
restraint was in some way desirable.99 This serves to highlight the 
importance of establishing some cognizable delegation of regulatory 
authority to the private group based on history or some other generally 
accepted public policy. 
Standard setting organizations can be essential to guiding public and 
private determinations of safety or interoperability; yet they look very 
similar to cartels that try to standardize products to reduce 
competition.100 The necessity of standards to facilitate interoperability or 
ensure safety provide the public policy justification for such 
organizations. It is also evident that such powers can be used to harm 
competition because of the resulting exclusionary power.101 Congress 
has recognized the social and economic necessity of such entities by 
specifying important aspects of their organization and decision making 
 
96. Elite Rodeo Ass’n. v. Prof’l Rodeo Cowboys Ass’n, 159 F. Supp. 3d 738, 740–41 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016). 
97. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 512 (2015) ([T]hose who 
pursue a calling must embrace ethical standards that derive from a duty separate from the dictates 
of the State . . . .”). 
98. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986). 
99. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (condemning a group 
boycott seeking better pay for court appointed defense lawyers); Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning a group boycott seeking to protect original 
dress designers from unauthorized copying). 
100. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).  
101. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500–01 (1988) 
(“When, however, private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective 
expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being 
biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition . . . those private 
standards can have significant procompetitive advantages.”); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. 
HydroLevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559 (1982) (noting that it was advantageous for businesses to 
adhere to private industry regulations to prevent boiler explosions). 
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process.102 When such entities adhere to those requirements, their 
antitrust liability is limited even if the specific conduct were to fall 
outside the scope of their regulatory authority or involve bad process.103 
If general authority to impose regulation on market activity exists, the 
second step requires determination that the specific anticompetitive 
regulation is within the scope of that authorization. In the case of statutes 
or the United States Constitution, standard tools of construction apply. 
Does the statute or the section of the Constitution authorize the regulation 
at issue in the case, or does the statute preempt antitrust law expressly or 
by necessary implication?104 Where the conflict is between antitrust and 
another federal law, the usual cannons of statutory construction apply and 
the analysis is cast in terms of preemption of one form or another.105 The 
key question is the scope of the preemption. Thus, the constitutional 
rights to petition government and to litigate have boundaries such that 
abuse of those rights can result in antitrust liability because the conduct 
falls outside the scope of the preemption.106 
States have the authority to authorize some kinds of anticompetitive 
conduct.107 For the state action exemption to apply, the courts must 
decide whether the statute does in fact have the objective of displacing 
competition with regulation. For example, the Court has rejected the 
claim that general authorization for ordinary corporate rights, such as a 
buying property, constitutes an implied right to monopolize the 
market.108 However, the Court has also determined that Wisconsin’s 
 
102. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 2, 
110 Stat. 775, 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272 and 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (Feb. 10, 1998)) 
(adopting rules through essentially formal delegations of federal regulatory authority). 
103. Standards Development Organizations Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4306 (2012). 
104. See Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007) (giving an 
expansive interpretation of the scope of preemption which some find troubling); see also Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004) (rejecting 
antitrust law application of exclusionary monopolistic conduct because state and federal regulators 
were better able to control the conduct). 
105. See, e.g., Oneok v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (rejecting claim that antitrust 
exemption for wholesale prices of natural gas preempts state antitrust claims on behalf of retail 
customers where the prices were fixed through the wholesale market). 
106. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513–14 (1972) 
(holding that it is immaterial how an antitrust violation is demonstrated if the facts establish 
massive, concerted, and purposeful group activity to deter individuals from accessing the courts); 
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993) (holding 
that litigation cannot be deprived of immunity as a sham unless it is objectively baseless); E. R.R. 
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–40 (1961) (discussing why the 
Sherman Act does not forbid associations from trying to influence the passage or enforcement of 
laws). 
107. See. e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943) (upholding state regulation of the 
production of raisins). 
108. FTC. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 233–35 (2013). 
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failure explicitly to confer antitrust exemption when allowing localities 
to refuse to provide water and sewer services to adjacent areas that 
refused annexation did not preclude the conclusion that the legislature 
must have contemplated and accepted the anticompetitive 
consequences.109 
In contrast, the determination of the scope of an authorization drawn 
directly from public policy without any express constitutional or statutory 
basis is more challenging. The opinions rarely recognize the need to 
define the scope of a de facto grant of regulatory authority. As a result, 
the analysis is muddled and obscure, as the dentists’ cases examined 
below will demonstrate. The core, but implicit, analysis at this stage starts 
with the public interest justification for the regulation which in turn 
implies the limits of its preemptive power. Such analysis is most 
transparent in the Supreme Court’s NCAA decision where it rejected the 
right of the NCAA to regulate access to televising college football, but 
then went to some lengths in dicta to identify the areas that were within 
the scope of the NCAA’s authority.110 Lower courts have followed that 
demarcation in rejecting some NCAA regulations, such as restraints on 
coaches’ salaries, but recognizing its authority to set compensation levels 
for student athletes.111 In other contexts, however, the lower courts have 
not been very clear about the scope of the authority that public policy has 
conferred.112 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself failed to ask about the 
scope of the California Dental Association’s authority to regulate 
advertising by dentists.113 
The first two steps are closely interrelated. Indeed, in the context of the 
state action doctrine, the two elements are fused in the single question of 
whether the state intends to preempt the competitive market.114 
 
109. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41–46 (1985); see also S. Motor Carriers 
Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61–62 (1985) (“[A] state policy that expressly permits, 
but does not compel, anticompetitive conduct may be ‘clearly articulated’ . . . .”). 
110. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113–15 (1984). 
111. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the NCAA has 
authority to determine whether and how college athletes can be compensated); Law v. NCAA, 134 
F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 1998) (prohibiting restraints on pay for assistant basketball coaches). 
112. See, e.g., Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 776 F.3d 
321, 327–35 (5th Cir. 2015) (avoiding the question of whether the conspiracy among animal breed 
registry organizations by determining there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy); Elite Rodeo 
Ass’n v. Prof’l Rodeo Cowboys Ass’n, 159 F. Supp. 3d 738, 748–50 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that 
there was insufficient evidence that the movant would succeed on its claim for Section 1 conspiracy 
under the Sherman Act). 
113. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999). See infra Section III.B (discussing 
the California Dental case). 
114. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980) 
(whether the state policy “clearly articulate[s] and affirmatively expresse[s]” the challenged 
restraint combines the questions of authorization and the scope of that authorization. The second 
step is to determine whether the policy is actively supervised by the state itself). 
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Preemption decisions involving federal law tend to recognize the 
distinction at least by implication because they look explicitly at the 
scope of the preemption as well as whether Congress intended to 
preempt.115 
The third step is to ask whether the parties have employed an 
appropriate process. Because the restraints directly or indirectly reflect 
an authorized regulation of competition, a standard akin to due process 
applies, but only to the extent that the underlying regulatory authority 
requires an appropriate process.116 Hence, constitutionally protected 
rights to petition are largely free from any antitrust constraints because of 
the scope of the underlying First Amendment right involved.117 But even 
then, antitrust law imposes some limits on the manner and means of 
petitioning.118 
When a private entity is carrying out a public regulatory process 
neutral oversight of its decisions is essential. Perhaps the most obvious 
cases where process is central are in the state action domain when the 
actor is a private group.119 States wishing to preempt competition by this 
means must provide active supervision to ensure appropriate process in 
 
115. For example, in United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.S. 344, 346–53 
(1959), both the FCC and the Justice Department had jurisdiction over acquisitions of television 
stations. Similarly, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 354–55 (1964), 
the Court rejected arguments that would have denied Clayton Act application to bank mergers 
which were also subject to review and approval by bank regulators. See also Oneok v. Learjet, 135 
S. Ct. 1591, 1596 (2015) (describing how preemption of antitrust by the National Gas Act with 
respect to wholesale prices does not preempt antitrust claims with respect to retail sales of gas). 
116. This requirement is clearest in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361–63 
(1963). In Silver, the Exchange had statutory authority to regulate its members’ relationships with 
third parties even when those parties were not trading through the Exchange, but the Exchange was 
still required to provide an appropriate process including notice and explanation for an order 
requiring members to refuse to deal with a third party. Id. 
117. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135–38 (1961) 
(finding the Sherman Act does not prohibit assembly for the purpose of attempting to persuade the 
legislature or executive from taking a certain action, even if that action would produce a trade 
restraint or monopoly); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–
70 (1965) (clarifying Noerr to stand for the proposition that attempts to influence public officials 
are shielded from the Sherman Act, “regardless of intent or purpose”). 
118. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 
(5th Cir. 1966) (holding the submission of false information to a state agency to manipulate prices 
violates antitrust law). See also In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., 138 FTC 1 (2004), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/07/040706commissionopinion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9PNU-RSH8] (holding that a firm offering expert advice on a regulatory matter 
violates the FTC Act if it misleads the agency to gain an economic advantage); Cal. Motor Transp. 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511–13 (1972) (explaining variations of conduct that 
could result in anticompetitive scrutiny, including barring competitors from access to adjudicatory 
processes, fraud, conspiracy with a licensing authority, and bribery of a public purchasing agent). 
119. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) 
(condemning state authorized price fixing when no state supervision is provided); FTC v. Ticor 
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) (condemning state authorized price fixing when agency 
charged with oversight failed in fact to review prices fixed). 
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both the adoption and enforcement of private regulations. The risk of bias 
is manifest when self-regulation addresses competitive issues, whether 
that involves competition among participants or with third parties. The 
Patrick decision provides an illustrative example of a private regulatory 
regime. There, restrictions on doctors based on poor performance 
explicitly satisfied the first two steps of this framework.120 Indeed, state 
and federal law authorized such regulation, and the putative reason for 
excluding the doctor fell within the scope of that authority. But Oregon’s 
failure to provide disinterested review on the merits of the exclusionary 
decision resulted in a condemnation of the process and awarding damages 
to the excluded doctor.121 
The same standard applies when the source of authority was a de facto 
authorization. Starting with the Silver decision,122 this emphasis on 
appropriate process has been a consistent theme for judicial review of 
private regulatory decisions. The outcomes in Allied Tube and Hydrolevel 
demonstrate this, as does the older decision in Radiant Burners.123 The 
Court focused on the inappropriate process that lead to exclusion by rule 
in the case of Allied Tube and by false statements in both Radiant Burners 
and Hydrolevel. To be sure, these entities lack some of the powers that 
expressly authorized regulatory bodies have,124 but this does not exclude 
the expectation of an appropriate process within the capacity of the entity. 
This three-step framework makes it possible to understand and explain 
the issues that the courts have to address in these cases. It also 
demonstrates that the issues are identical whether the source of regulatory 
authority is statutory, constitutional, or based on a de facto delegation of 
authority to some self-regulatory organization. Another important 
implication is that if the regulation at issue is within the scope of the 
 
120. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988). 
121. See id. at 101–06 (discussing the lack of active supervision over peer-review decisions, 
through state action or direct judicial review). 
122. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963). Many scholars believe that 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Supply Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), 
overruled Silver. This is incorrect. Northwest involved a rule internal to a joint venture (a buying 
cooperative) where the restraint was ancillary to legitimate needs of that venture. In Silver, the 
exclusionary conduct involved a party that had no dealings with or on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The only reason the Exchange could lawfully compel its members to refuse to deal was 
because it had the authority to police (regulate) the overall integrity of the public capital market. 
Subsequent cases involving standard setting organizations demonstrate that process remains central 
to the legality of such regulatory entities. See cases cited infra note 123. 
123. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1988); Am. 
Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel, Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569–72 (1982); see also Radiant 
Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658–60 (1961) (upholding complaint that 
gas utilities standard setting to ensure safety in gas furnaces was allegedly used to exclude plaintiff 
without justification). 
124. See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638–39 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding state law created an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce by requiring specific due process). 
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authority of the actors and they adhered to appropriate process, a court 
enforcing the antitrust laws should recognize that the resulting regulation 
is exempt from antitrust review even if the court believes there are 
persuasive arguments that the regulation is in some sense 
unreasonable.125 Just as courts have no basis for saying whether or not a 
particular cartel restraint is or is not reasonable (the sea of doubt) so too 
the antitrust laws do not provide any standard by which to judge the 
correctness of any specific lawful regulation.126 The three-step 
framework applies to the full range of exemptions from antitrust law, 
creating a more consistent standard for the courts to use. It also avoids 
the open-ended balancing that comes from reliance on an overly broad 
“rule of reason” and so eliminates the tension between the general rule of 
per se illegality for naked restraints and the putative “reasonableness” of 
few such restraints. This in turn facilitates an overall better focus for the 
evaluation of all restraints because it restores the central importance of 
the naked-ancillary dichotomy to that analysis. 
III.  ANTITRUST LAW AND PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION IN 
DENTISTRY 
The series of cases involving regulation of the business practices of 
dentists provides an illustration of the utility of the framework laid out in 
the preceding section. In addition, it demonstrates the problems the courts 
have in articulating a coherent legal model when they misuse the rule of 
reason category and search for procompetitive justifications or 
explanations for regulatory restraints. But it also highlights the 
challenges, especially in determining when a general public interest can 
authorize private groups to engage in regulatory control over market 
conduct. 
 
125. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
NCAA is not exempt from Sherman Act liability but its cartelistic agreement to refuse to allow 
players to benefit from the commercial use of their images was lawful; this makes sense only if 
such a regulation was within the scope of the NCAA’s delegated regulatory authority as the 
majority opinion implicitly decides). 
126. There are, of course, other legal regimes that might apply. Substantive due process was 
once a basis, such as in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), but courts have largely 
abandoned that framework in significant part because of the ambiguity inherent in reviewing 
legislative decisions. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 543 (1934) (discussing the 
narrow circumstances where judicial review of a legislative decision is proper). This leaves a 
serious problem of limiting anticompetitive regulations and laws. See Carstensen, Where Is 
Attorney General Waldo, supra note 28, at 775 (discussing the anticompetitive judicial landscape); 
see also Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1588 (discussing the anticompetitive problem in relation to 
private board licensing). 
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A.  The First Dental Case: Indiana Federation of Dentists 
The Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD) was a group of dentists 
primarily in northern Indiana who agreed to refuse to provide x-rays to 
insurers of their patients. This plan was a continuation of an agreement 
to deny insurers access to x-rays that the Indiana Dental Association 
(IDA), the dominant professional association of dentists in Indiana, had 
initiated in 1972. The IDA abandoned that plan in 1979 after the FTC had 
challenged its legality.127 
The FTC challenged the IFD agreement as a group boycott, but took 
the position that it was illegal because it violated the rule of reason.128 
Presumably the FTC misinterpreted the reference to the legality of 
“ethical” regulations in Professional Engineers and its repetition in 
Goldfarb, as teaching that only “unreasonable” cartelistic conduct was 
unlawful.129 Hence, the FTC accepted the IFD’s claim that its naked 
restraint had a lawful motive or purpose.130 The putative “good thing” 
that this restraint accomplished was blocking the unauthorized practice 
of dentistry and the potential harm to patients resulting from insurance 
company use of non-dentist claim reviewers to “evaluate” x-rays. 
Basically, the IFD was asserting the right to regulate who could practice 
dentistry. The FTC opinion does not articulate any sort of a standard for 
determining when collective self-regulatory action by professionals 
might be reasonable. Without explicitly recognizing that the IFD was 
claiming the right to agree to enforce its interpretation of state law about 
the practice of dentistry, the Commission opinion simply questioned the 
validity of claimed unauthorized practice based on the state of the law in 
Indiana.131 It appears that the non-dentist reviewers could authorize 
payment of claims, but if they had any questions or concerns, the file was 
referred to a licensed dentist to evaluate.132 
Further complicating the case, the state of Indiana had intervened.133 
This led to a claim of state action. The Commission rejected this claim, 
finding that the state had not authorized the elimination of competition in 
the provision of dental services.134 There is no real suggestion that the 
IFD had state authority to regulate dentistry or to impose requirements on 
 
127. In re Ind. Dental Ass’n, 93 F.T.C. 392, 398 (1979) (describing how the association 
consented to an order requiring it to cease pressuring dentists to refuse to provide x-rays). 
128. In re Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 168–69, 175 (1983). Such an approach to a 
naked cartelistic restraint is inconsistent with basic antitrust jurisprudence. 
129. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978); Goldfarb v. Va. 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 779–80 (1975). 
130. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. at 168. 
131. Id. at 181. 
132. Id. at 177. 
133. Id. at 184. 
134. Id. at 182–84. 
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dentists.135 To the extent that any such regulation would or could exist, it 
would have to emanate from the state dental board, a state agency distinct 
from the IDA or the IFD. 
The FTC found that the boycott was a violation of Section 5 because 
it was an “unreasonable” violation of the Sherman Act.136 The analysis 
involved some curious positions. The targets of the boycott were dental 
insurers, particularly those providing insurance under employer group 
plans. The opinion treats the relationship of insurer to dentist as 
ambiguous because the insurer is not the “customer” of the dentist.137 
The better economic analysis would have been that the insurer is either 
the customer or a joint purchaser with the insured. Further confusing the 
analysis, the opinion identified the competitive issue in terms of dentists 
competing for the business of such insureds rather than as a collective 
action by most of the dentists in the relevant area to exploit insurers by 
denying them the capacity to review the decisions of the dentists. These 
ambiguities, along with FTC’s ambiguous analysis of the “good things” 
excuse for the boycott, resulted in a less than clear articulation of the basis 
for its negative conclusion.138 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the IFD prevailed.139 The opinion 
endorsed by two of the judges is a model of misapplication of antitrust 
law. It noted that Indiana, subsequent to the events at issue in the case, 
adopted some additional statutes governing the practice of dentistry that 
arguably forbade the providing of x-rays to non-dentists.140 It also took 
the view that: “This policy of quality and proper dental care comports 
with the Indiana dentists’ code of professional conduct, . . . [and the 
American Dental Association’s position],” that dentists should provide 
“quality care.”141 Hence, “the collective refusal . . . to comply with the 
insurers’ x-ray directive resulted from the dentists’ adherence to a legal, 
moral, and ethical policy of quality dental care . . . .”142 Employing a 
very narrow definition of group boycott (“a group of competitors banning 
[sic] together to protect themselves from non-group competitors”),143 the 
opinion took the position that the refusal to provide x-rays did not involve 
 
135. At some points IFD sought to claim that it was a union and so exempt from antitrust on 
that basis. Id. at 171. 
136. Id. at 179–80 n.24. 
137. See id. at 173 (differentiating between the effects of economic coercion and market 
competition). 
138. See id. at 177–80 (discussing the lack of clarity from the Court and the specific facts of the 
present case which lead to the conclusion that a full analysis is not required). 
139. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir. 1984). 
140. Id. at 1127 n.4. 
141. Id. at 1134. 
142. Id. at 1135. 
143. Id. at 1136. 
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a refusal to deal with either customers or competitors!144 Further, since 
the insurers could have their dental reviewers visit the offices of the 
dentists to review the medical records, “the IFD member dentists did not 
engage in a complete refusal to deal with the . . . insurers.”145 Under the 
majority’s conception of the rule of reason, there was no violation 
because the dentists only sought to ensure quality care and not to drive 
competing dentists from the market.146 Essentially, the majority assumed 
that the IFD had authority to regulate the provision of dental care even 
though Indiana had a state agency charged with that obligation. Finally, 
the opinion asserted that the FTC had failed to show any adverse 
competitive effects because the record did not show “an anticompetitive 
effect among dentists as to . . . dealing[s] with group dental health care 
insurers.”147 
The concurring opinion from Senior Judge Fairchild rejected the 
majority characterization of the conduct as benign. He pointed out that 
the record showed that “IFD [had] the power to frustrate to a significant 
extent the insurers’ need to review x-rays . . . without going to exorbitant 
expense.”148 Because the FTC’s decision claimed the anticompetitive 
effect was among dentists affecting their competition to serve insured 
patients, the judge agreed with his colleagues that the Commission had 
erred. Thus, the failure of the FTC to explain clearly that the boycott 
sought to protect from review the ability of dentists to determine what 
procedures they would perform—thereby creating significant risks of 
excessive costs to insurers—resulted in a concurrence rather than a 
dissent. 
On petition of the FTC, the Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision.149 The opinion, like the concurrence in the 
court of appeals, focused on the explicit economic character of the 
restraint. Like the FTC, the opinion invoked the “rule of reason” as the 
basis for decision although it did not provide a definition of that rule. It 
applied the rule in part because the IFD was a professional organization 
and in part because the economic impact of the restraint might not be 
 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1137. 
146. Id. at 1139. 
147. Id. at 1143–44. 
148. Id. at 1145 (Fairchild, J., concurring). Further, he observed that there were “clearly and 
adequately supported finding[s] of . . . an economic motive” for the refusals to provide x-rays. Id. 
at 1146. 
149. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986). The FTC itself alone petitioned 
for review, which it has a right to do. The Solicitor General apparently refused to support the 
petition which may imply again that those charged with enforcing the antitrust laws were uncertain 
about the analysis of the kind of restraints at issue in this case. 
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“immediately obvious.”150 What is not explained is why either of those 
facts should require a balancing of competitive effects of a naked restraint 
on competition. Once the record showed that there was no productive 
joint venture or transaction that could justify the restraints, their character 
as naked restraints was manifest. The invocation of the IFD’s 
professional status suggests that some naked restraints are entitled to 
some further analysis when the organization imposing such restraints has 
a particular status. But even then, what criteria would govern the validity 
of any restraint imposed? The Court’s opinion failed to clarify which 
cartels can make a claim of reasonableness or what criteria courts should 
employ to determine the legality of the restraint. 
In the Court’s view, however, the application of the rule of reason was 
“not a matter of any great difficulty.”151 The restraint was essentially 
equivalent to a price fixing arrangement (i.e., a cartel) that impaired the 
ordinary market functions. Moreover, the IFD had the burden of 
demonstrating a procompetitive justification for the restraint. Of course, 
IFD was arguing that it needed to restrain unlawful conduct by third 
parties rather than the kind of efficiency enhancing (procompetitive) 
benefits that legitimate joint ventures and transactions can confer on the 
economy. Not surprisingly, the Court found that “[n]o credible argument 
has been advanced for the position that making it more costly for the 
insurers and patients who are the dentists’ customers to obtain 
information needed for evaluating the dentists’ diagnoses has any such 
procompetitive effect.”152 Thus, the analysis showed that this was 
essentially a naked restraint among competing suppliers of dentistry.153 
Moreover, the absence of proof of market power was not relevant and the 
burden rested on the IFD to provide a procompetitive justification. The 
opinion also rejected the quality of care argument stressing its factual and 
legal flaws.154 
The IFD had also argued that Indiana’s law on the unauthorized 
practice of dentistry justified its regulatory restraints and that, therefore, 
the state action doctrine protected it. While rejecting the claim that state 
law prohibited providing x-rays for review, the opinion added: 
Even if the Commission were incorrect . . . , the Federation’s argument 
would fail. That a particular practice may be unlawful is not, in itself, a 
sufficient justification for collusion among competitors to prevent 
it. . . . Anticompetitive collusion among private actors, even when its 
goal is consistent with state policy, acquires antitrust immunity only 
 
150. Id. at 458–59. 
151. Id. at 459. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 460–61. 
154. Id. at 462–63. 
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when its actively supervised by the State. . . . There is no suggestion of 
any such active supervision here . . . .155 
Some fifteen years later, the Court seems to have forgotten this 
admonition when it upheld the right of California dentists to establish 
ethical standards regulating competition and enforcing them without any 
system of disinterested oversight and supervision. 
B.  California Dental Association 
The California Dental Association (CDA) is an organization of 
regional dental groups. Dentists must belong to a regional group to be 
able to be members of CDA. The CDA included more than 70 percent of 
all dentists licensed to practice in California and in some regions its 
membership exceeded 90 percent.156 The CDA in turn is part of the 
American Dental Association (ADA) and a dentist can belong to the 
ADA only if he or she is a member of the CDA. The CDA imposed on 
its members a set of “ethical” rules that regulated the kinds of advertising 
and solicitations in which members might engage. Effectively, these 
regulations forbade most kinds of price and discount advertising as well 
as advertising based on the quality of care.157 The CDA had various 
sanctions it imposed on members, including exclusion from membership, 
for violating its regulations. 
The FTC’s opinion and the subsequent judicial analyses reported that 
membership was worth as a much as $65,000 to a dentist because of 
various insurance and equipment deals that the CDA provided to its 
members.158 In addition, there is some suggestion that patients are 
attentive to whether a dentist is a CDA-ADA member and prefer such 
individuals.159 For these reasons, the threat of exclusion from the CDA 
was powerful and allowed it to compel deviant dentists to adhere to its 
regulations. 
The FTC had a long-standing program of challenging such restraints 
on advertising by professional associations.160 Its basic theory was that 
 
155. Id. at 465. 
156. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 788 (1999). 
157. In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 192 (1996). 
158. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 762; Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 207.  
159. Assuming CDA membership is a certification of enhanced skill, that would have no 
relationship to whether or how a dentist advertised his or her skills. Hence, certification cannot 
justify regulating member advertising. 
160. See, e.g., Complaint, Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., F.T.C (2014) (C-4448), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140404musicteacherscmpt.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7UL4-3YRA] (alleging the Music Teachers National Association Code of Ethics restrains 
trade by disallowing teachers from recruiting students from other studios); Complaint, Cal. Ass’n 
of Legal Support Prof’ls, F.T.C. (2014) (C-4447), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
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such conduct increased the cost of professional services. Less explicit 
was a related concern that the lack of advertising affected demand for the 
services. Hence, less restrictive rules were likely to result in both lower 
prices to existing consumers and increased consumption as potential 
consumers learned about the location, cost, and benefits of the 
professional service involved. 
Rather than settle the case, CDA choose to litigate in an administrative 
proceeding that took several years to wind its way to the commission. 
CDA’s primary argument was that the FTC lacked jurisdiction over it 
because it was a not-for-profit entity and the language of the act arguably 
denied coverage. The CDA also defended its regulations on their merits. 
It contended that its rules were intended to avoid misleading consumers 
who had limited capacity to understand or shop for dental services. The 
CDA also argued that its rules had no effect on the market and, 
alternatively, that they were “procompetitive” because they eliminated 
false and misleading advertising from the market. The FTC on the merits 
determined that there was no efficiency or pro-competitive virtue in the 
kind of categorical commands that the CDA imposed. The trial staff had 
chosen not to put on an economist who would have testified to the price 
and demand effects of these restraints.161 Hence, the commission’s 
majority opinion had to rely on a generalized assumption that the 
restraints had adverse effects.162 
Chairman Pitofsky, a distinguished antitrust scholar and practitioner, 
wrote the decision and applied both the per se rule and the rule of 
reason.163 The per se part of the decision focuses on the indisputable fact 
that a private group had agreed to limit their competition with each other 
through restrictions on advertising that were enforced against any 
member who deviated.164 This sets forth a classic cartel story.165 The 
opinion draws that connection and essentially points out that the 
conspiring dentists were not engaged in any collective productive activity 
or transaction to which the restraint was ancillary.166 It omits any 
 
files/documents/cases/140404californiaassoccmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2PQ-JN42] (alleging the 
California Association of Legal Support Professionals Code of Ethics restrains trade by disallowing 
members from lowering prices to compete with other members of the association, and from 
speaking negatively about other members). 
161. See Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not the Quick Look But Not the Full 
Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 537 n.214 (2000) (citing CDA’s brief that reported that the FTC 
had decided not to put its economic expert on the stand). 
162. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 308–16. 
163. Id. at 296–97. 
164. Id. at 303–07. 
165. See Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, 
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941, 946 (describing how cartels can focus on any relevant 
dimension of competition in order to facilitate exploitation of the market). 
166. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 306–07. 
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reference to the subsequent discussion of CDA’s claimed right to enforce 
state law. The failure to highlight the subsequent analysis that the CDA 
lacked authority to create or enforce regulations and that the state had 
created a state agency with exactly that responsibility may explain why, 
as the case moved through the courts, these issues gradually disappeared. 
But the fact that this was a “professional” organization led to a 
confusing limit to this per se analysis. Hence, the opinion also reviewed 
the restraints under a rule of reason. Based on a footnote in the Goldfarb 
decision167 and its elaboration in Professional Engineers,168 the FTC 
opinion acknowledged that an exception apparently exists for 
professional organizations to adopt and enforce rules that affect 
competition.169 The FTC decision does not suggest what kinds of 
practices might be in this privileged group, nor does it distinguish 
between regulating competition and some other types of ethical issues 
which professional groups might address. 
Applying this ill-defined standard, the Commission held the restraints 
themselves were unreasonable with respect to the prohibition on 
members adverting prices and non-price advertising such as quality 
claims. But it asserted with respect to the latter, “we cannot say with . . . 
confidence that, as a facial matter, CDA’s concerns are unrelated to the 
public service aspect of its profession.”170 This implies that this private 
group, without any showing of authority, somehow had the right to 
regulate competition in the market without any disinterested supervision 
so long as it could assert a public service justification. This would mean 
that some cartelistic restraint on competition was lawful, but the FTC 
opinion went on to find that these restraints had or were likely to have an 
adverse effect on competition and so were inherently suspect. Still, if the 
public service justification were valid, then the expected result would be 
some regulation or restriction of competition. The opinion seems to 
regard the fact that the CDA had market power because “dentists place a 
high value on the benefit of membership in CDA because of its insurance 
 
167. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar Ass’n, 421 U.S. 773, 788–89 n.17 (1975) (“The fact that a 
restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in 
determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to 
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically 
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service 
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could 
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We 
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.”). 
168. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
169. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 306 (“To be sure, the ‘public service aspect, and other 
features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be view as 
a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.’” (quoting Arizona v. 
Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348–49 (1982))). 
170. Id. at 307. 
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and educational programs”171 as a basis to reject the public service claim. 
The analytic logic is unclear, but it might mean that if the restraint 
affected the market, then it lacked a public service justification. But that 
would imply that any effective regulation would be unlawful. 
Finally, there were no efficiencies to justify the restraint. The CDA 
contended that either its restraints had no effect on competition (a claim 
that is inconsistent with the entire idea of regulating advertising) or that 
they were procompetitive because they challenged only “advertising that 
is false or misleading.”172 The Commission rejected the assertion that 
these rules only excluded false or misleading advertising, pointing out 
that they prohibited “truthful offers of discounts” and sought to eliminate 
all quality claims even when those claims were no more than “personal 
opinion.”173 
What is missing from this analysis is a positive explanation of why the 
CDA and its members might desire excessive and unreasonable 
regulation of advertising. By severely limiting advertising, dentists could 
assure each other that they would not poach each other’s customers, and 
they would reduce the risk of price cutting affecting their income. The 
FTC opinion on the merits only suggests that the “ethical” claims were a 
pretext for reducing the risks of competition without elaborating on the 
potential gains. Moreover, because the CDA was a professional 
association, the opinion is deferential to the putative expertise or 
disinterestedness of the parties. As a result, the opinion fails to make a 
compelling case against the self-interested restraints that it was 
challenging. 
The final part of the decision addresses “CDA’s argument that its 
actions are lawful due to the existence of similar restrictions imposed on 
advertising by the state of California.”174 The decision treated this as a 
claim of state action exemption and rejected it. California had neither 
authorized CDA to enforce its rules on dental advertising nor did it 
supervise CDA’s conduct.175 CDA’s position was somewhat more 
nuanced in that it claimed that because its rules prohibited conduct that 
was also prohibited by state law, its conduct was lawful.176 It pointed to 
its right under California law to challenge prohibited conduct.177 Further, 
CDA contended that “no anticompetitive effect results if an association’s 
code of ethics incorporates state law, and one who violates state law is 
 
171. Id. at 313. 
172. Id. at 323. 
173. Id. at 316–18. 
174. Id. at 322. 
175. Id. at 324–25. 
176. Id. at 323.  
177. Id. 
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deemed to have violated the association’s code of ethics.”178 Thus, CDA 
tried to position itself as merely enforcing state law and, indeed, as having 
authority to do so via the means of a challenge before the State Board of 
Dental Examiners. The FTC found that while some of CDA’s rules 
paralleled the state’s, others were more expansive. In addition, it 
observed that “our own review of the law finds no hint that CDA or any 
private association should be permitted to interpret or enforce these laws 
on its own.”179 The Supreme Court had rejected a similar argument in the 
IFD case.180 
Indeed, the state dental board’s staff had prepared a “discussion paper 
analyzing the constitutionality and wisdom of limits placed on dentists’ 
advertising.”181 That paper concluded that the commercial speech 
decisions of the Supreme Court had “probably invalidate[d] the present 
California statutes and regulations prohibiting dentists from advertising 
‘superiority’” as well as pointing out that the extensive limitation on 
advertising may have “harmed . . . segments of the public who do not use 
dental services because they are not conscious of their availability or 
cost.”182 These requirements of the First Amendment did not apply to 
CDA as a private organization. But by ignoring these concerns, the CDA 
arguably exceeded the scope of any regulatory authority it may have 
possessed. Moreover, its perspective on the balance of consumer interests 
and its own members’ economic interests involved an inherent structural 
bias.183 
Finally, the FTC decision concluded that the record did not reveal a 
single instance “in which the State enforced its advertising proscriptions 
against a dentist.”184 As a result, “the CDA perceived itself as filling an 
enforcement void.”185 Even if the CDA had some authority to enforce the 
state rules, it claimed only the right to initiate proceedings before the state 
dental board to enforce the advertising regulations. Such proceedings 
would have allowed the challenged dentist to assert constitutional rights 
as well as forced the regulators to confront the question of whether such 
 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 325. 
180. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986) (rejecting the idea that private 
actors, acting independent of the State, can claim antitrust immunity even when their goal is 
consistent with state goals). 
181. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 325. 
182. Id. at 325–26. 
183. Cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008) (finding the dual role 
companies play—determining both which benefits their employees are eligible to receive and 
which benefits the company will pay themselves—is a factor that must be considered when 
determining whether a plan administrator has abused its discretion). 
184. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. at 328. 
185. Id. 
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draconian restrictions served the public interest. Like the North Carolina 
dental case to be examined next,186 the CDA had chosen a path that 
avoided the active, disinterested state supervision that is the hallmark of 
the state action doctrine. 
While the FTC decision strongly rejects the CDA claim that its conduct 
was lawful because it was enforcing state law, the placement of the 
analysis at the end of the decision made the issue marginal to the overall 
result. The issue is characterized, correctly, as an affirmative defense, but 
it would seem to be central to the case if one looks at the CDA as a 
regulator. As such, absent some authorization, it is essentially a cartel 
imposing its will on its participants. Moreover, as in some other 
situations, the restraints were “add-ons” to a bundle of valuable services 
so that the CDA had the capacity to compel adherence by the threat of 
denying those benefits.187 
The CDA appealed to the Ninth Circuit where again it focused on its 
primary contention that the FTC lacked jurisdiction over it because it was 
a not-for-profit entity. The description of the CDA’s activities highlighted 
the fact that the state did not enforce the advertising rules and that the 
CDA “attempted to fill in the gap with its own enforcement efforts.”188 
But the opinion then characterizes the restraints as “a set of ethical [sic] 
guidelines promulgated by a professional organization for the apparent 
purpose of preventing false and misleading advertising.”189 For this 
reason the opinion rejected per se characterization of the restraints. “The 
value of restricting false advertising . . . counsels some caution in 
attacking rules that purport to do so but merely sweep too broadly.”190 
Hence, the court undertook a “further inquiry” into the effect of the 
restraints “on competition.” It agreed that the price advertising restraints 
“amounted in practice to a fairly ‘naked’ restraint on price competition 
itself.”191 Such restraints “make it more difficult for consumers to find a 
 
186. See discussion infra Section III.C 
187. Such cartelistic add-ons to legitimate ventures have occurred in a variety of circumstances. 
See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer 
Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES 171, 201–03 (Dan Crane & Eleanor Fox eds., 2007) (arguing that the 
territorial restraints at issue in that case were not necessary for the joint venture of producing house 
brands, but rather served the discrete interest of the participants in limiting competition among 
themselves); United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 383 (1956) (two major 
global chemical companies used a joint venture in Latin America as the basis for an agreement 
limiting competition in various chemicals around the world); PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 
F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (joint venture unlawfully agreed to restrict price competition from 
products that were potential substitutes for the joint venture product). 
188. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1997). 
189. Id. at 727. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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lower price and for dentists to compete on the basis of price.”192 The 
analysis proceeded to consider the claim that preventing false and 
misleading advertising was “procompetitive.” This is an odd use of the 
term because this is regulation to suppress disfavored marketing 
practices. Moreover, this is a justification that any cartel might advance 
for its self-imposed regulations. The court’s opinion compared the CDA’s 
regulations on advertising discounts with those the FTC’s rules 
prohibited to show that the CDA included excessive restrictions making 
such price promotions “infeasible,” and the record offered no evidence 
that the rules had improved disclosure rather than suppressing it.193 Thus, 
the court focused on the merits of these regulations and concluded that 
they were substantively unreasonable. This implied that the CDA could 
lawfully impose less restrictive advertising regulations. 
The analysis of the non-price advertising restraints is similar. The 
decision acknowledged that such restraints can “affect output” and so are 
“sufficiently naked . . . to justify quick look analysis.”194 In support of its 
use of a form of the rule of reason, the opinion cites the Indiana 
Federation of Dentists and Professional Engineers decisions.195 Finding 
the specific regulations excessive, the conclusion followed that they were 
unreasonable.196 Here again the implication was that some less restrictive 
regulation of such advertising would be lawful even though it was a naked 
restraint on competition. This analysis assumes that the CDA had both 
general and specific authority to regulate advertising by its members. 
CDA also contented that it did not “intend” to restrain competition but 
rather the purpose of its code was to ensure that dentists “compl[ied] with 
state law.”197 This defense might have supported a conclusion that the 
CDA did not have independent authority to regulate advertising because 
the state already had such regulations and the capacity to enforce them. 
Moreover, it would have followed clearly from the rejection of the 
comparable claim in the IFD decision.198 
Indeed, the decision did point out that the CDA intended to restrain 
competition because the “point of the advertising policy was clearly to 
limit the types of advertising in which dentists could engage.”199 
Moreover, loss of membership “appears to present a significant hardship 
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 728. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 727. 
196. Id. at 730. 
197. Id. at 729. 
198. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1986) (rejecting all three of the 
Indiana Federation of Dentists’ arguments, specifically the rule of reason defense). 
199. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 128 F.3d at 728. 
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for some dentists.”200 While the proof of economic power—the capacity 
to coerce individual dentists—was not overwhelming, given the 
inherently anticompetitive character of the restraints that the CDA 
enforced, the majority found that the FTC had sustained its claim that the 
restraints were “unreasonable” under an abbreviated rule of reason 
analysis. What is lost in this decision is any focus on the question of the 
CDA’s authority to enforce the state law regulations under the guise that 
it was only enforcing “ethical” rules governing its members.201 
Supreme Court review followed with a five to four reversal of the court 
of appeals decision, and by implication, the FTC’s approach to the 
analysis of professional restraints.202 Neither the majority nor dissent 
refers to CDA’s defense that it was enforcing the state law on dental 
advertising. At the same time, the majority quantified the value of CDA 
membership at between $22,000 and $65,000.203 The Court was 
unanimous that the FTC Act applied to nonprofit entities.204 But it split 
on the question of whether the record established that the CDA’s 
restraints violated antitrust law. 
The majority recognized that the CDA’s restraints were “naked” 
restraints on competition, but still were subject to a rule of reason: “we 
[have] held that a ‘naked restraint on price and output requires some 
competitive justification.’”205 But because the “likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects” was not obvious, the use of a quick look rule of 
reason was inappropriate.206 The restraints “might plausibly be thought 
to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition.”207 This declaration stood in stark contrast to the 
foundational decision creating the per se rule which rejected all efforts to 
excuse or justify a naked restraint.208 
The analysis then focused on the difficulties consumers might 
experience in assessing advertisements for dental services. This makes a 
 
200. Id. at 730. 
201. Id. at 730 (Real, J., dissenting) (stating the FTC lacked jurisdiction over the CDA because 
the operation was not commercial in nature, but instead only provided services to its members). 
Additionally, the dissent argued that there was no evidence of restraint on price competition 
because the CDA was only trying to ensure that its members did not engage in “misleading or 
unrealizable advertising.” Id. at 731. 
202. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999). 
203. Id. at 762. 
204. Id. at 768–69. 
205. Id. at 769–70 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)). 
206. Id. at 771. 
207. Id.  
208. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 223–24 (1940) (rejecting the 
defendants attempt to justify their restraints on environmental and resource conservation grounds). 
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case for regulating advertising by all dentists.209 The majority rejected 
the conclusion that barring discount advertising would have a “net 
anticompetitive effect” and indeed such advertising itself might be 
“anticompetitive” because it misleads consumers.210 Similarly, the 
majority expressed concern that quality advertising would induce “some 
patients to obtain more care than they would in its absence . . . .”211 Aside 
from the remarkable assertion that consumers would buy excessive 
quantities of dental care in response to advertising as opposed to 
misleading pitches by dentists, the basic implication of this point is again 
that there is a case to be made for regulation of dental advertising. 
The majority asserted that the rule of reason required proof of 
anticompetitive effect.212 Hence, the Court of Appeals had misapplied 
the rule of reason and was obliged to decide whether the record the FTC 
had made showed that these regulations had actual anticompetitive 
effect.213 This directly conflicts with the Socony concept that naked 
restraints are illegal in and of themselves regardless of effect.214 The 
majority remanded the case for further review by the Circuit Court as to 
whether the record would support such a conclusion.215 The failure of the 
FTC to offer expert economic testimony meant that the record lacked 
specific evidence of adverse effects from these restraints.216 
On its merits, without some qualification, this decision would have 
undermined all cases using per se standards to challenge cartels and other 
similar naked restraints on competition. Outside of the professional 
context, the only defenses on the merits open to the parties to an admitted 
agreement restraining some element of competition is that restraint is a 
legitimate incident to a joint venture or other transaction involving the 
parties. This is the core of the ancillary restraint concept, and it is central 
to the explanation of when and how the rule of reason applies generally. 
The opinion rejects the application of the quick look standard for 
condemning these restraints as unreasonable. The reasoning was that the 
restraints might be “pro-consumer” because they eliminated false 
advertising harmful to consumers. Hence, a more searching evaluation 
 
209. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 772–75 (recognizing that regulators might address many of 
its concerns, the Court makes no reference to the regulatory regime in place in California). 
210. Id. at 775. 
211. Id. at 776–77. 
212. Id. at 776–81. 
213. Id. at 779–80. 
214. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 223–24 (1940). 
215. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 958 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the FTC 
chose to dismiss the case once the Court of Appeals concluded there was insufficient proof of actual 
effects in the record). 
216. Calkins, supra note 161, at 537 n.214 (noting that the CDA’s reply brief summarized some 
of the shortfalls of the complaint counsel, such as failing to call an expert economist prior to trial). 
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was required.217 As shown earlier, some quick look cases involve 
situations in which the naked restraint hypothesis is very strong, despite 
the presence of a joint venture or transaction to which it might be 
ancillary, and so the burden shifts to the parties to justify their restraint.218 
In such cases, the defender must show that the restraint is more than 
reasonable.219 The second strand of quick look decisions involve cases 
such as IFD and NCAA, where there is either manifestly no authority to 
regulate a market or the regulation at issue is clearly outside whatever 
authority the regulator has. Applying this model, what makes CDA 
different—such that more than a “quick look” is required—is that it was 
not manifest that the CDA lacked the authority to regulate the business 
practices of its members. The restraints themselves specify and restrict 
how CDA members may compete and are within the scope of what a 
lawful regulator might attempt to impose. To be sure, First Amendment 
requirements might impose non-antitrust limits to such regulation. 
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion has an explanation of 
how or why the CDA received permission to regulate dental advertising. 
CDA’s claimed authority to enforce state law on dental advertising is 
never mentioned. Indeed, there is no reference to those laws nor is there 
any discussion of the authority granted to CDA to challenge alleged 
violations made by complaint to the state’s Dental Board. Thus, the 
decision and, essentially, the dissent assumed that the CDA had authority 
as a professional association to regulate competition. Further, the opinion 
does not address the question of how the CDA, given its economic self-
interest, could disinterestedly balance the interest of consumers in having 
good information (more advertising inciting price and service 
competition) with their interest in not being misled. 
C.  North Carolina Dental Board Examiners 
The North Carolina Dental Board is an official agency of the state 
charged with regulating the practice of dentistry. Dentists licensed in the 
state elect all but two of its eight members who themselves must be 
 
217. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771–74, 776–78. 
218. See, e.g., Poylgram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint is not harmful to customers). 
219. Compare Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (defendant is 
required to show the necessity of the restraint as well as the restraint’s efficiency) with Arizona v. 
Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“For the sake of business certainty and 
litigation efficiency, [the Court] has tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown 
inquiry might prove to be reasonable.”). See generally United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. 
Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (stating that the party gaining an advantage is a new entrant or 
failing firm), aff’d, Jerrold Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Rothery Van Lines 
v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d. 210, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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practicing dentists.220 In addition, dental hygienists elect one member 
and the governor of the state appoints a member. The Board’s direct 
authority is over dentists and not non-dentists. But it has the authority to 
initiate suit to enjoin the unlicensed practice of dentistry. 
Various types of teeth whitening services emerged in North Carolina 
in the 1990s. These included in-office services and take-home kits 
provided by dentists, over-the counter products, and services offered by 
non-dentists, often located in shopping centers. By the early 2000s, North 
Carolina dentists were complaining to the Board about the non-dentist 
services. The FTC’s review of those complaints suggested that they 
focused on the low prices being charged and rarely on any possible 
consumer harm.221 The Board discussed the issue and advised 
complaining dentists that it was investigating and “attempting to shut 
down these providers.”222 The Board could have initiated litigation to 
challenge these activities as the unlawful practice of dentistry, but then 
the courts would have been the final arbiter of the question of whether 
this practice fit within the ambiguous statutory definitions.223 
Alternatively, the Board could have proposed a rule interpreting the 
statute to forbid non-dentists from engaging in whitening.224 Such a rule 
would have required review and approval by a legislative committee.225 
Instead, the board’s leadership issued a series of cease and desist letters 
to offending individuals, landlords, and suppliers. The effect was to limit 
or eliminate competition from non-dentist whiteners. 
In 2010, the FTC challenged this conduct. The FTC’s claim was 
narrowly framed around the specific procedure that the Board had 
employed to implement its conclusion. Implicit in the claim and explicit 
in the ultimate order is the acceptance of the right of the Board to employ 
other methods to establish and enforce its position.226 Thus, the FTC did 
not dispute the right of a state regulator to adopt an expansive definition 
of the practice of dentistry and seek to enforce it in permissible ways. The 
focus of concern was that the Board was acting unilaterally in issuing 
 
220. In re N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 640, 641 (2011). 
221. Id. at 645–46. 
222. Id. at 646. 
223. Id. at 682–83 (stating that the Board of Dental Examiners would have likely had the burden 
of proving that whitening constituted the practice of dentistry as set forth in the statutes). Hence, 
this would have ensured plenary review of the sort that Patrick v. Burget required. See Patrick v. 
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–02 (1988) (rejecting the claim that the state provided active supervision 
of the peer review process). 
224. Such a rule would have had to differentiate among the different methods of whitening that 
included systems that individuals could buy at retail and use as well as ones that dentists provided 
to patients for home use. Hence, such a rule making process would require some complex drafting 
and justification. 
225. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 648. 
226. Id. at 684. 
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these notices without any oversight or review by any disinterested state 
agent. 
The Board’s primary defense was that it was exempt from antitrust 
claims based on the state action doctrine.227 It also contended that there 
was no concert of action, that the product market was wrongly defined, 
that the letters were not orders, and that the letters had no adverse 
competitive effects.228 The FTC rejected the claim of a state action 
exemption in 2011 because practicing dentists dominated the Board’s 
membership and so some other state entity had to actively supervise the 
Board’s actions.229 
After a fruitless round of appeal to the federal courts,230 the case 
proceeded to decision on the merits. The ALJ found collusion among 
board members to exclude non-dentists from teeth whitening services and 
that the letters had in fact caused non-dentist whiteners to leave the 
market, deterred manufacturers from supplying such competitors, and 
caused mall-owners to stop leasing space to such services.231 The Board 
argued that even if it was not exempt, the public safety and welfare that 
its efforts sought to protect justified its conduct. The ALJ rejected this 
defense. 
The Board appealed, emphasizing three major issues.232 First, it 
disputed the existence of a conspiracy. It claimed that its members were 
not independent economic actors capable of a conspiracy as defined in 
antitrust law and also that the evidence did not show conspiracy even if 
the members were independent actors.233 Second, the Board contended 
that there were “procompetitive” justifications for its conduct that 
outweighed any adverse harm. This argument invoked the Board’s status 
as a state agency intended to promote public welfare through “enhanced 
legal competition.”234 Third, the Board challenged the scope of the relief. 
It contended that the proposed order would prevent it from investigating 
and challenging the unlawful practice of dentistry.235 In addition, it 
 
227. Id. at 649–50. 
228. Id. at 649. 
229. See id. at 626 (granting partial summary judgement denying the state action defense). 
230. Id. at 650. See N.C. State Bd. Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 818, 820 (E.D.N.C. 
2011) (stating the plaintiffs do not have the right to challenge FTC administrative proceeding under 
the collateral order doctrine). 
231. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 651. This finding reflects, no doubt, the need to 
establish effect from a naked restraint on competition because of the use of the “rule of reason” 
approach. 
232. Id. at 653. 
233. Id. at 653–60 (the FTC had little trouble in rejecting these claims). 
234. Id. at 653.  
235. Id. 
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sought reconsideration of the earlier decision that it was not exempt as a 
state actor.236 
The FTC decision did not invoke the per se label and instead continued 
to articulate a form of the rule of reason that would uphold cartelistic 
conduct. The decision framed three alternative versions of this standard. 
The first, drawn from horizontal joint ventures that significantly restrain 
direct competition, reflects a presumption of illegality where the 
anticompetitive attribute is manifest, and the prima facie justification is 
weak. In such cases, the restraint requires some competitive 
justification.237 The cases cited in support of this standard, however, 
mixed joint venture cases such as Realcomp and Polygram where the 
restraint was inconsistent with the legitimate goals of the venture, with 
regulatory cartel cases such as Indiana Federation of Dentists, NCAA, 
and Professional Engineers.238 The resulting citations show the 
confusion of functional categories. 
In the second category were cases where the “restriction in question 
was ‘not sufficiently naked’” to call for a presumption of illegality.239 
But direct evidence of the adverse effects overcomes the lack of proof of 
market power. The distinction between these first two categories is 
elusive. Both essentially rely on an assessment of the impact of the 
restraint, including the lack of a sufficient justification to create a 
presumption that it is illegal. 
The third category requires that the challenger have proof of actual 
detrimental effect on competition. This standard actually requires proof 
of “market power” based on “market definition” which demonstrates “the 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”240 In its 
explication of this standard, the opinion does not provide any benchmarks 
to assist in determining when a restraint on competition will have 
“genuine effects” or even whether those effects must have occurred or 
need only be “potential” ones. Moreover, at least implicit is a claim that 
antitrust law can assess the reasonableness of regulatory restraints on 
their merits. 
The opinion applied all three of these standards to the facts of the case 
and found the restraints unlawful under all three.241 The conduct fitted 
 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 656. 
238. Id. at 656 (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984); Nat’l Soc. Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978); RealComp II, v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 815 (6th Cir. 2011); Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 
F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
239. Id. at 656–57 (quoting Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S.at 460). 
240. Id. at 657 (citing Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460). 
241. Id. at 658. 
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the “inherently suspect” category because “[t]he challenged conduct is, 
at its core, concerted action excluding a lower-cost and popular group of 
competitors.”242 In essence then, this was cartelistic conduct that 
protected incumbents from competition by imposing a putative regulation 
eliminating a class of competitor. In any other context, it would be per se 
illegal. 
Nevertheless, the FTC undertook to consider the purported 
justifications for this conduct but also observed: “A cognizable 
justification is ordinarily one that stems from measures that increase 
output or improve product quality, service, or innovation.”243 This 
approach conflates ancillary restraint analysis where the expected 
outcome is economically positive with claims that a specific cartel results 
in some socially desirable result.244 
The decision rejected “public health and welfare” as a justification for 
such restraints despite the apparent acceptance of the analogous argument 
in CDA.245 This seems incorrect as a statement of regulatory authority. 
Certainly, the Dental Board was charged with implementing exactly that 
kind of regulation. More relevantly, the FTC decision rejected the 
Board’s effort to justify its entitlement to consider health and welfare 
based on its status as a state agency. Here the decision pointed out that 
the conduct at issue was “not consistent with its enforcement mandates” 
which implies that, if the Board brought suit in state court, this would 
have been a “way the board is authorized to enforce the Act.”246 
Moreover, the FTC concluded that the record did not support these 
justifications on their merits. Teeth whitening does not present serious 
health risks and the record did not support the claim that the Board was 
responding to evidence of risk as opposed to concern about economic 
competition. Thus, the FTC undertook to make a decision about the 
 
242. Id. at 667–74. 
243. Id. at 674–75. Two of the three cases cited for this proposition involved transactions or 
ventures to which the restraints were arguably ancillary. Only the open-ended text of IFD involved 
a case of comparable purely cartelistic conduct. 
244. Many commentators believe that the Court’s decision in Board Of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918), justifies this conflation because of the 
assumption that the restraints at issue in the case were naked limits on competition. Such an 
assumption is false. The restraints were functionally ancillary to the legitimate needs of the 
exchange. See Carstensen, The Hollow Core of Antitrust, supra note 40, at 50–52 (demonstrating, 
based on records from the Board and the Department of Justice, the restraints were ancillary to the 
legitimate interests of the joint venture which was the board of trade and sought to control 
opportunistic behavior of a class of integrated traders). 
245. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 642, 652 (noting that the ALJ found that 
“antitrust laws do not permit defense based on social welfare or public safety concerns”). 
246. Id. at 678. Even such enforcement might be objectionable in light of Patrick v. Burget, 486 
U.S. 94, 94 (1988), which rejected the exclusion of competing doctors based on claimed dangerous 
practices where the only potential supervision of the conduct was through a court challenge. 
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merits of the underlying regulations, thereby apparently conceding that if 
there were merit to the justifications, the Board could use its cease-and-
desist approach to stop this form of competition. Of course, if the state 
had provided “active supervision,” even unreasonable regulations would 
be exempt from antitrust challenge.247 
The Commission made shorter work of the other two justifications. 
The claim that the exclusion was in furtherance of legal competition was 
the same defense that the Supreme Court had rejected in its IFD 
opinion.248 Similarly, the claim that the Board had acted in good faith 
and so should not be held liable conflicted with holdings running back 
100 years.249 
The FTC proceeded to do a full “rule of reason” analysis.250 Its starting 
point was the determination that the Board possessed market power in the 
broadly defined teeth whitening business. It used its state-conferred 
power to create a perception among non-dentist teeth whiteners, their 
landlords, and their suppliers that it could and would ban all non-dentist 
whitening. This conduct had adverse effects on the market by eliminating 
lower-cost alternatives. Moreover, there were no acceptable justifications 
for this conduct. Thus, basically, the rule of reason analysis was a 
repetition of the inherently suspect analysis which was itself effectively 
an application of the per se rule, given the initial conclusion that the 
Board was neither authorized to engage in the specific restraints nor 
subject to active supervision. 
Not surprisingly, the Board sought review in the Fourth Circuit and 
received an outpouring of support from professional associations.251 The 
court, however, sustained the FTC’s result. It recognized at the outset that 
the Board lacked statutory authority to engage in the specific conduct 
(process) of issuing cease and desist orders to non-dentists. The Board’s 
legal arguments were three-fold: it claimed a state action exemption, 
denied that there was concerted action, and contended that its activities 
did not unreasonably restrain trade.252 
 
247. But this would not necessarily exclude other challenges based on state law or state or 
federal constitutional requirements. See Carstensen, Where Is Attorney General Waldo, supra note 
28, at 808–20 (identifying the ways in which state law can provide oversight of otherwise exempt 
regulations); Allensworth, supra note 25, at 1586 (summarizing the conclusions reached by the 
Court in similar cases). 
248. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. at 676. 
249. Id. at 681–82 (citing Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912)). 
250. Id. at 682–83. 
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among those who signed the AAI brief. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 
363 (4th Cir. 2013). 
252. Id. at 366. 
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Because the majority of the dental board were practicing dentists, they 
were elected by dentists, and there was no active state supervision of the 
cease-and-desist notice campaign, the opinion rejected application of the 
state action exemption.253 Despite the Board’s reference to generic 
oversight of its conduct, the opinion upheld the FTC’s determination that 
it was inadequate. The court cited Patrick emphasizing the need for 
review of the “particular anticompetitive acts.”254 
Second, the decision easily concluded that there was collusion because 
the board members had individual economic interests that required 
collective action to exclude competition. Thus, the focus here was on the 
board as a collusive group and not some larger set of dentists. Indeed, 
individual dentists had the constitutional right to lobby the board to take 
action against non-dentists engaged in teeth whitening. Thus, the decision 
limited the conspiracy to the board itself. In contrast, both IDF and CDA 
were not public agencies and so it was plausible to recognize all 
participants as part of the conspiracy. 
The most problematic element of the decision was its review of the 
FTC’s determination that the Board’s conduct on its merits was unlawful. 
Reciting the three levels of scrutiny from per se through quick look to full 
rule of reason, the opinion embraced the FTC’s quick look analysis: “We 
affirm . . . its conclusion that the Board’s behavior was likely to cause 
significant anticompetitive harms.”255 The citations in the opinion’s 
discussion mix naked restraint cases such as Fashion Originators Guild 
and National Professional Engineers with references to Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers and PolyGram—all cases involving restraints 
arguably ancillary to legitimate joint ventures.256 A paragraph 
summarized the confusing dicta from Goldfarb and Professional 
Engineers that courts “should be hesitant to quickly condemn the actions 
of professional organizations”257 But in this case, the court had no 
problem seeing the unjustified anticompetitive aspect of the conduct.258 
Because this decision created a circuit split, the Supreme Court granted 
review.259 The primary focus at this stage was again on whether the active 
supervision requirement applied to a state authorized board whose 
members had an inherent conflict of interest. Once again, the majority 
decision highlighted the path that the Board could have taken that would 
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have been subject to such supervision: “The Board may promulgate rules 
and regulations governing the practice of dentistry within the State, 
provided those mandates are not inconsistent with the Act and are 
approved by the North Carolina Rules Review Commission, whose 
members are appointed by the state legislature.”260 Accepting that the 
state had conferred on the Board authority to suppress competition by 
defining the scope of dental services, the majority focused on the Board’s 
specific steps to implement it, for which there was no “active 
supervision” from the state. The policy rationale for requiring oversight 
treated as comparable conduct both private market regulation by standard 
setting groups and state authorized regulation by self-interested 
regulators.261 This analogy was stressed later in the opinion where the 
court observed that “[t]he similarities between agencies controlled by 
active market participants and private trade associations are not 
eliminated simply because the former are given a formal designation by 
the state, vested with a measure of government power, and required to 
follow some procedural rules.”262 
The relation of professional ethics to regulatory authority also received 
attention. “[T]hose who pursue a calling must embrace ethical standards 
that derive from a duty separate from the dictates of the State.”263 
“[T]here is a strong tradition of professional self-regulation, particularly 
with respect to the development of ethical rules.”264 This paragraph does 
not provide a definition of “ethical standards” as distinct from “self-
regulation.” The paragraph does not cite to CDA although its implication 
is that the CDA regulations on advertising were “ethical” and so 
reflective of a “duty separate from the dictates of the state.” Yet from a 
functional perspective, it is impossible to distinguish between the 
regulations at issue in CDA and NCDB. 
The broad impact of this decision is to call into question actions by 
regulatory boards where self-interested members of the profession or 
activity being regulated dominate the decision process. States must either 
fashion oversight for such agencies or not create them.265 
Unlike either IFD or CDA, the Board had at least apparent access to 
the powers of the state to coerce non-members into conformity with its 
 
260. Id. at 1108 (stressing that “the Board’s concern [with non-dentist teeth whitening] did not 
result in a formal rule or regulation reviewable by the independent Rules Review Commission”). 
261. Id. at 1111 (“[S]tandards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in way difficult 
even for market participants to discern.”). 
262. Id. at 1114. 
263. Id. at 1115. 
264. Id. 
265. The majority opinion emphasized that “the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible 
and context-dependent. Active supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s 
operations or micromanagement of its every decision.” Id. at 1116. 
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commands. In IFD, the only restraint arose from mutual commitment to 
the goal of denying x-rays to insurers. CDA, in contrast, had substantial 
economic power over its members because there were no apparent 
alternative ways to obtain the same cost savings. Hence CDA, like the 
Board, had a capacity to compel obedience to its mandates, and like the 
Board its determinations of what were reasonable regulations were not 
subject to any active supervision. 
IV.  THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE PER SE LEGALITY FRAMEWORK 
AND THE ROLES OF ETHICS AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
A.  Per Se Legal Framework 
The three dental cases illustrate the applicability of the Carstensen-
Roth per se legal framework. It identifies the central issues in these 
regulatory cases, the specific questions to be resolved, and provides 
consistent and generally applicable standards for determining the 
appropriate outcome. Further, it avoids open-ended balancing and so 
avoids creating an inherent conflict with the general rule of per se 
illegality for naked restraints. As a result, the framework also provides a 
coherent basis to critique decisions where courts have failed sufficiently 
to address the relevant issues. 
The IFD claimed it had authority to regulate the market for dental 
services to protect patients from the unauthorized practice of dentistry. 
But there was no basis in law or custom for this claim. Hence, the analysis 
in the case is best understood as an inquiry into IFD’s authorization to 
regulate the practices of dentists and dental insurers. The poverty of 
doctrinal language in antitrust meant that this inquiry was cast in terms 
of an application of the rule of reason although the restraint was without 
doubt a naked agreement among independent businesses to restrain 
competition—functionally a cartel. Once the Court found that the IFD 
lacked any authority to regulate dental practice, there was no basis to 
exempt its cartelistic conduct from that which is per se illegal. This was 
true even if the laws of Indiana made the reading of x-rays by non-dentists 
an unlawful practice of dentistry. The state had, after all, a public agency 
empowered to enforce any such rule. 
The NCDB, in contrast, had the authority to regulate the practice of 
dentistry in North Carolina. Moreover, given ambiguous statutory 
language defining what constituted practicing dentistry, it was within its 
substantive authority to propose a definition that included some or all 
forms of teeth whitening as falling within the scope of dental practice. 
None of the decisions from the FTC to the Supreme Court disputed this 
right. 
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Rather, the case turns on the third element of the framework: the 
process by which the decision was made and implemented. The Board’s 
process of sending cease and desist letters to non-dentists avoided 
necessary disinterested supervision. Hence, its conduct—which, again, 
otherwise constituted a naked restraint of competition—was not exempt 
and so unlawful because it had used an unacceptable process. The focus 
on “active supervision” is thus a little misleading. There was no way to 
provide supervision of any kind over the specific method employed under 
the circumstances in North Carolina.266 What the Court ultimately 
decided was the definition and enforcement decisions of a self-interested 
professional regulatory body require such supervision. The state’s failure 
to establish sufficient oversight means that the agency has used an 
unacceptable process to define and/or enforce regulations that would 
otherwise be within the scope of its authority.267 
The CDA provided economically valuable services to its members. 
Hence, there might have been an argument that its restraints were 
ancillary to those services. But in fact, there was no connection between 
those services and the regulation of advertising by dentists. Access to 
those benefits did not create any “free riding” potential nor did access 
provide the kind of interdependent competitive advantage that might 
make some restraint on how the members compete ancillary to such 
controls.268 In short, those restraints were not ancillary and therefore not 
amenable to the standard rule of reason analysis. 
Instead, the CDA used the threat of denial of these services as a 
weapon to compel any potentially deviant member to adhere to its 
regulatory policies. It acted coercively to enforce cartelistic restraints on 
advertising. To justify this conduct, its argument was essentially that it 
had authority to regulate competition among its members, which also 
directly affected CDA member competition with other dentists. 
Advertising regulation restricting false and misleading advertisements 
has general social and economic utility by facilitating competition on the 
merits. This can be particularly desirable when many consumers have 
limited capacity to appreciate price-quality interaction. Dental care may 
 
266. Conceivably, if some disinterested supervising authority reviewed and approved such 
letters, that might have sufficed as active supervision. 
267. The implication to be drawn later is that when there is state licensure of a profession, the 
state has the obligation to provide active supervision of whatever means maybe employed to 
restrain or restrict competition within the profession or between the profession and other potential 
providers of related services. 
268. There is an argument that the CDA promoted the use of dentists and had some concern for 
how its members presented themselves. But so far as it appears, any such promotion was distinct 
from the services provided to dentists. Moreover, accurate offers of discounts or general statements 
about quality would not appear directly to exploit any broader communication about the skills of 
members of the CDA. 
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fit within that category. But such claims are irrelevant in a conventional 
antitrust analysis as the Supreme Court had declared in IFD: 
“Anticompetitive collusion among private actors, even when its goal is 
consistent with state policy, acquires antitrust immunity only when its 
actively supervised by the State.”269 
To exempt its cartelistic regulation of competition, CDA had to 
establish that it had authority to regulate dental advertising. Its position 
before the FTC and the Court of Appeals was that, like IFD, it was only 
enforcing California’s laws governing such advertising. Indeed, before 
the FTC, it pointed to its right to challenge dentists who violated state law 
before the state’s dental board. The CDA, unlike IFD, was the state 
affiliate of the national association of dentists and so had the appearance 
of being in some way entrusted with an independent right to regulate the 
practice of dentistry, at least by its members. As a result, the implicit 
assumption in the Supreme Court’s CDA decision was that the CDA had 
authority to regulate how its members competed with each other and with 
non-members. 
Neither side in the Supreme Court litigation raised the issue of CDA’s 
authority to regulate the practice of dentistry. Rather, the briefing focused 
on whether the FTC had jurisdiction over such a not-for-profit entity and 
whether the record justified a quick look at the reasonableness of the 
underlying regulations. Because the court inferred that the CDA had 
authority to regulate advertising and manifestly the regulations focused 
only on advertising, the first two steps of the framework were satisfied. 
Moreover, the FTC did not challenge in any way the CDA’s process for 
developing or enforcing its regulations. Thus, the CDA’s regulations 
were exempt from antitrust law. The remand implicitly asked the lower 
court to focus on whether the FTC’s record showed that the regulations 
exceeded the bounds of what was authorized. If the regulations had 
denied consumers sufficient access to the market—the kind of evidence 
that would come from economic analysis of the actual impact of the 
regulations—then arguably there was either bad process or the 
regulations themselves had an ulterior motive (market exploitation) 
rather than protecting consumers. On remand, the circuit court decided 
that the evidence did not show the regulations to be “unreasonable.”270 A 
better way to explain this result would have been to declare that there was 
no evidence in the record that the CDA’s regulations exceeded its 
regulatory authority. Hence, they were exempt from antitrust law. 
Looked at through the per se legal framework, the Court’s CDA 
decision reflects two questionable conclusions. The more significant was 
 
269. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986). 
270. Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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the assumption that CDA had authority to regulate competition in the 
market. Had that question been a focus of decision, the Court should have 
found that the State of California has a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
for the practice of dentistry, including advertising regulations, and that 
the CDA had standing to challenge violations by any dentist, member, or 
non-member. Additionally, the CDA could advocate for new or revised 
rules based on protecting consumers. Hence, the Court ought to have 
concluded that CDA lacked authority to enforce directly the state law. 
Second, even if the initial assumption were accepted because of the 
independent historical record of self-regulation, the CDA used an 
improper procedure because it acted unilaterally in a way similar to the 
NCDB, and had not sought disinterested agency review. That agency, 
which itself was aware of the problems with some of the advertising 
regulations, would have acted as the required neutral reviewer of the 
competitively important decisions to ensure that they served the public 
interest that justified the regulatory authority in the first place. 
B.  Avoiding the “Sea of Doubt” 
The overt approach of the courts and the FTC to determine the merits 
of specific regulations imposed by self-regulatory entities results in 
setting sail on the “sea of doubt” and purporting to say how much and 
what kind of public interest regulation makes otherwise per se unlawful 
restraints “reasonable” as a matter of antitrust, and therefore lawful. Since 
the purpose of any regulation is to limit the freedom of action of the 
parties regulated, it should be tautological to conclude that any regulation 
restrains competition. But the public interest justification for such 
restraints is that, on balance, they result in a more socially desirable 
marketplace. For example, Edlin and Haw argue that courts should allow 
regulations that serve some public interest even if it harms competition, 
provided the court, on balance, concludes that the harm to consumers is 
outweighed by the benefits they receive.271 Hence, a court enforcing 
antitrust law must decide whether the regulation is itself reasonable in 
terms of the permitted objectives of the regulatory authorization. Such 
balancing is distinct from the potentially complex analysis required to 
determine whether regulatory authorization exists, specific restraints are 
within the scope of some authorization, or appropriate process was 
employed. These latter analyses often will involve balancing inferences, 
but those determinations all involve the resolution of an underlying 
defined factual-legal question. 
 
271. Edlin & Haw, supra note 18, at 1111 (describing how “[r]egulation was [originally] 
justified by the idea that the public benefits outweighed the costs of higher prices and reduced 
economic liberty,” however, licensing boards became dominated by practitioners themselves, and 
therefore, self-dealing is inevitable “when the regulated act as regulators”). 
2020]     The Incoherent Justification for Naked Restraints of Competition 733 
Litigation is not well suited to the broad participation or fact intensive 
inquiry required by the regulatory process. There can be no hard and fast 
rules for the scope of prophylactic regulations. This is a legislative and 
policy judgment that is not appropriate for courts.272 Antitrust law and 
the courts enforcing that law are badly positioned to review the merits of 
specific regulations. Antitrust law does not provide standards or criteria 
that can provide a rational or consistent basis to determine whether a 
regulation is substantively reasonable. The result will be ad hoc decision 
making reflecting the preferences of the decision maker: “the vague and 
varying opinion[s] . . . as to how much [restraint of competition], on 
principles of political economy . . . ought to be allowed.”273 
The per se legal approach limits courts applying antitrust law to 
determining whether the regulator has authority, acted within that 
authority, and employed appropriate process. If those elements are 
established, the regulation is exempt from antitrust law. There should be 
no review of the merits of the ultimate regulation. This would more align 
the review of all regulatory restraints with the standards used for state 
action exemptions as well as those employed to determine whether there 
is a constitutional or federal statutory basis to preempt antitrust 
jurisdiction. 
Such abstinence by antitrust law does not mean that the underlying 
regulation is exempt from all legal review. The Bates case provides a 
good illustration of this proposition in the context of professional 
regulation.274 The Arizona bar had prohibited lawyers from advertising 
and the state supreme court, the overseer of such regulations, had 
approved. This meant that the state action requirements were satisfied and 
there was no antitrust liability.275 But because this restraint affected 
commercial speech, it was subject to constitutional challenge and found 
to be an unconstitutional infringement.276 Going further, a finding that a 
regulation is arbitrary and capricious goes beyond any antitrust concern 
and would reject irrational regulations even if they had no anticompetitive 
implication. Another state law strategy is to impose a somewhat stricter 
standard on those regulations that have competitive effect by requiring 
 
272. See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 30 (1994) (noting that alternative systems 
of control, i.e., courts, legislatures, and markets, all have imperfections, and the crucial policy issue 
is which is the least problematic to address regulatory need); see also Allensworth, supra note 25, 
at 1609 (describing how legislative and policy judgments of this sort are not appropriate for the 
courts). 
273. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898). 
274. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
275. See id. at 357 (finding that the regulation was shielded from the Sherman Act). 
276. Id. at 358. 
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that the regulation be no more intrusive than reasonably necessary for the 
legitimate regulatory goal.277 
An important conclusion from this analysis is that whenever the state 
has determined that a profession should be regulated, it must undertake 
the active supervision of that regulation. A history of self-regulation 
should be irrelevant once the state has determined that the public interest 
requires licensure and other oversight of professional conduct. This 
means that any claim of de facto regulatory authority to exempt such 
entities from antitrust should fail at the first step of the analysis. 
There are very few if any professions that are not subject to state 
supervision.278 Hence, the assertion of authority to regulate business and 
economic practices by professional self-regulatory organizations is 
highly questionable. If they lack authority to regulate, then any restraint 
on competition among the members of the profession or with other 
professions is indistinguishable from ordinary cartel activity. 
The harder cases involve entities that are not subject to state 
supervision because of their interstate character, but are also not subject 
to direct federal supervision. For example, standard setting organizations, 
as well as the NCAA, are not and should not be subject to state oversight 
even when the states may make use of the resulting standards.279 
However, Congress has specified—as a condition of limiting antitrust 
liability—that all the elements of the per se legal framework exist 
including some form of disinterested review.280 The Supreme Court 
hinted at this requirement in the Allied Tube decision.281 
The same considerations should apply to sports regulators and other 
similar self-regulatory organizations (SROs). The Tarkanian litigation is 
an example of the incapacity of states to regulate interstate college 
 
277. See Carstensen, Where Is Attorney General Waldo, supra note 28, at 808–10 (discussing 
state statutes and court interpretations that support a stricter review). 
278. See generally Allensworth, supra note 25. 
279. See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638–39 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Nevada’s effort to 
regulate the NCAA’s processes because it would unduly burden the NCAA’s interstate regulatory 
efforts). This is not to deny that some oversight is essential to ensuring that these entities perform 
in the public interest. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492, 495 
(1988) (standard-setting process wrongfully manipulated to exclude competing technology). 
280. See Standards Development Organizations Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4306 (2012) (requiring for modified antitrust liability when a standard setting organization operates 
in such a way that all stakeholders participate, and the decisions are made by a consensus of all 
participants). 
281. See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509–10 (noting how immunity and antitrust liability are 
intertwined; thus, when a party has an economic interest and also exercises decision making 
authority in formulating a product standard, the party is left without immunity from antitrust 
liability). 
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athletics.282 As a result, absent a federal regulatory agency,283 any 
regulation must come from an SRO—the NCAA in that case. But such 
an SRO should not be free to impose regulations outside the scope of its 
implied authority.284 Courts can apply the framework to focus on the 
justification for such regulatory efforts, and then consider whether the 
restraints at issue are within the scope of that authority and whether their 
implementation is subject to some disinterested reviewer with sufficient 
resources and capacity.285 
Courts, because of their experience in reviewing administrative 
procedure and other similar issues, are better able to evaluate whether the 
process of rulemaking and enforcement is done fairly and with necessary 
disinterested review than they are to deal with focused review of the 
merits of specific regulatory decisions. This avoids the “sea of doubt” and 
puts the direct control of the regulatory process back in the hands of the 
delegated regulators with appropriate oversight and review of their 
actions. It is hard to see how even the FTC could fulfill this role even 
with greatly enhanced resources. The resulting network of regulations is 
too complex for any one national agency to oversee. Hence, the SRO that 
is not subject to state or federal oversight itself must provide for its own 
oversight or be subject to some explicit statutory scheme that creates a 
relevant disinterested overseer.286 
C.  The Irrelevance of Exclusion Versus Exploitation 
Some scholars have sought to emphasize the distinction between 
exploitive agreements, such as standard cartels, and exclusionary ones 
that focus on removing or restricting a competitor, customer or supplier’s 
 
282. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (holding that in excluding an individual 
from the profession of coaching the NCAA did not engage in “state action” for purposes of 
triggering constitutionally protected rights). See also Miller, 10 F.3d at 640 (holding state law 
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce by requiring due process before college coaches 
could be sanctioned). 
283. See generally, Mathew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote 
the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 
837, 850–51 (2014) (proposing a regulatory agency solution to the control of college athletics). 
284. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984) 
(condemning NCAA restrictions on the televising of football games as being beyond the scope of 
its authority); see also Carstensen & Olzowka, supra note 89, at 594–95 (examining how the 
Tarkanian lawsuits did not invoke antitrust law, but the invocation of antitrust law might have 
provided a route to review the lawfulness of the NCAA’s procedures). 
285. As noted earlier, the O’Bannon decision highlights the NCAA’s regulatory role as well as 
its inherent conflicts of interest that are not subject to any oversight. See generally O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
286. The analysis of these issues can only be suggested here and will require fuller elaboration 
in another article. 
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capacity to compete.287 Exploitive agreements among competitors are 
generally considered to be more likely to be illegal288 while exclusionary 
agreements are expected to be more likely to have legitimate 
justifications.289 In IFD and CDA the agreements involved exploitive 
collusion. The parties limited their competition among themselves by use 
of refusals to deal with insurers in IFD, or threatened exclusion from 
valuable benefits in CDA. Yet despite the similarity of the conduct, the 
courts’ decisions resulted in contradictory outcomes. 
Neither organization limited the ability of third parties to compete 
although such competition was unlikely to be significant. In the case of 
the IFD, even if other dentists would deliver x-rays to insurers, that was 
unlikely to affect competitors because patients were unlikely to move 
from one dentist to another absent strong compulsion from the insurer. In 
CDA, the agreement probably did require the adherence of most 
practicing dentists, assuming advertising of quality or discounts would 
move patients. If there was any significant competition from such 
providers, it is unlikely that the CDA could or would have insisted on the 
prohibitions. Hence, some measure of dominance or other economic 
analysis showing the restraint’s likely effect might seem relevant. 
But the general rule governing naked restraints established in the 
Socony case is that effect is irrelevant because the violation is the 
agreement itself.290 Moreover, as the Court framed the issue in IFD, the 
fact of the agreement created a presumption that the parties expected and 
intended to affect competition.291 Thus, unless either law or other public 
policy authorized an agreement among competing professionals to limit 
their competition, per se, the agreement should be condemned despite any 
claim that it had minimal or no actual effect. Any other result would 
threaten the core of the per se rule against cartels. 
 
287. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. 
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE CASE, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 47–51 (3d ed. 2017) (setting forth the distinction between collusive (i.e., exploitive) and 
exclusionary conduct as a central organizing principle of the text); see generally Jonathan B. Baker, 
Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2013). 
288. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 (1980) (per curiam) 
(showing an example of an exploitive agreement deemed illegal); see also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., 
Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1990) (per curiam). 
289. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 287, at 166, 601. Compare FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 419 (1990) (condemning a naked refusal of a deal to obtain higher 
compensation) with Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing, 472 U.S. 284, 293 
(1985) (exclusion from joint venture was valid incident to membership rules and so could only be 
unlawful only if it had unreasonable anticompetitive effect). 
290. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). 
291. See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. FTC, 476 U.S. 447, 457–59 (1986) (stating that an agreement 
limiting consumer choices cannot be allowed under the rule of reason). 
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Yet CDA reached an opposite result. Indeed, on its face the decision 
would seem to reverse Socony and reinstate the open-ended balancing test 
advocated by the dissent in Trans-Missouri.292 Because the opinion 
emphasized the salience of professional self-regulation, the decision has 
not had the negative impact that it might have had. Nevertheless, these 
two cases both involved the same kind of collusive exploitation, but the 
Court made no effort to reconcile the results.293 
In contrast, the NCBD sought to define specific activities as the 
practice of dentistry thereby excluding those who engaged in 
unauthorized competition. Its effort was exclusionary by use of powers 
conferred by the state and, unlike CDA or IFD, not directly exploitive. 
Should this distinction make a difference legally? This is a naked 
exclusion created by collusive action of those with control over access to 
the market.294 Consequently, the ultimate function of such an agreement 
is to ensure protection for incumbents from an innovative form of 
competition. Unless the conspirators have the authority to impose such a 
market regulation—like a purely exploitive cartel—this agreement 
should be unlawful on its face. 
In sum, the distinction between collusive exploitation and exclusion is 
not helpful in explaining the results in these cases or in restraint of trade 
cases generally. 
D.  Ethics, Substantive Standards, and Certifications 
The professional regulation cases frequently cast such restraints as 
ethical standards. As the earlier discussion pointed out, this is a 
misnomer. The restraints at issue in these and related cases involve 
conventional limits on economic competition. They do not pertain to the 
actual practice of the profession nor do they address the resolution of 
particular dilemmas where the professional must make a choice among 
courses of action having significant impact on others. There are no 
significant cases involving actual professional standards of practice. This 
is the case, in significant part, because adherence to a standard is a 
 
292. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897) (White, J., 
dissenting) (advocating a reasonableness test for cartels); see also Carstensen, Lost in (Doctrinal) 
Translation, supra note 34, at 533–34 (stating that the dissent rejected the approach of interpreting 
antitrust law on a basis of the function of a restraint and instead proposed a balancing test based on 
the merits and demerits of the particular restraint ). 
293. One possible reconciliation is that IFD involved an effort to exploit otherwise sophisticated 
insurers who presumably needed no protection while CDA involved protecting consumers from 
deception. For all the reasons discussed earlier, this may provide a plausible rationale for regulation 
in one area and not another, but it does not explain why one cartel is potentially lawful and the 
other is not. 
294. See generally Baker, supra note 287. 
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decision by the professional and the standard relates to the practice of the 
profession itself. 
Standards can create competitive issues if a professional standard 
setting group uses its dominance over certification or other related 
professional requirements to exclude or exploit qualified individuals.295 
Such certification requires a different functional analysis as it involves 
the production and dissemination of economically relevant information. 
A certification or accreditation provides information to the customers or 
suppliers, and it takes on competitive significance when customers 
collectively prefer only one provider of such a service. That confers 
economic power on such an entity. The recent litigation involving 
osteopathic certification is an example.296 The certifiers required that all 
those seeking certification must also take costly memberships in the 
organization. This tying requirement was anticompetitive and unjustified 
under a standard ancillary analysis. 
Only if some consensus were to emerge that a particular source of 
substantive standards should dominate some dimension of professional 
practice would an analysis like the one developed here be the appropriate 
model. The central concern should remain essentially whether the 
standard setter has authorization, its standards implement that 
authorization, and it employs relevant process in determining the 
substantive dimensions of the practice or procedure. Further, there would 
have to be some impact on the market. If the facts were similar to those 
in the case of the osteopathic doctors, the analysis would be reasonably 
straightforward. On the other hand, if the standard setting system satisfies 
the per se legal criteria, it would be unwise for courts, under the guise of 
enforcing antitrust law, to revise specific standards or undertake de novo 
review. This does not preclude critical analysis of the validity of the 
regulatory authorization itself—either on constitutional grounds, e.g., 
burden on interstate commerce, or conflict with federal law. Nor would 
 
295. The American Osteopathic Association (AOA) tied certification for this type of medical 
practice to the doctor joining the association. In connection with an antitrust class action, the 
association rescinded that tying requirement. See AOA Staff, AOA Settles Class-Action Lawsuit, 
DO (July 27, 2018), https://thedo.osteopathic.org/2018/07/aoa-settles-class-action-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/DU5M-ALXL]. 
296. See id. (explaining the recent litigation between AOA and board-certified physicians in 
requiring membership in the association). In approving the settlement which foreclosed individual 
opt outs, the judge rejected the views of five state attorney generals. See $84M Settlement Approved 
in American Osteopathic Association Antitrust Class Action, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/84m-settlement-approved-american-osteopathic-080538710.html 
[https://perma.cc/BD6R-YBA2]. 
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it preclude a more critical analysis than courts often give of the validity 
of specific regulations.297 
V.  A PATH FORWARD TO GOVERN PRIVATE REGULATION 
Given the reluctance of the American political process to impose new 
direct regulation, as well as the practical consideration that public 
regulation is often poorly designed and inefficient, a primary goal of 
competition law should be to oversee private regulatory efforts to ensure 
that they serve public interest goals as well as possible. Initially this 
requires careful application of the first two steps of this framework to 
ensure both that there is a legitimate authorization for the regulatory 
process, and that the specific regulations are within the scope of that 
authorization. There needs to be much more explicit recognition and 
acknowledgement of these elements. The present mushy rule of reason 
language in opinions obscures the dual inquiry in the case of de facto 
regulatory authorization. 
Such recognition also requires the creation of standards for 
determining the validity of the authorization. While a variety of evidence 
is available, a court should always put the burden of persuasion on the 
advocate of de facto regulatory authority to establish the justification for 
and acknowledgment of the delegation of authority. In some contexts, 
such as standard setting, the social need for, and reliance by, units of 
government on the standards to implement safety or other requirements 
will provide a good justification. 
In the case of professional self-regulatory associations, the analysis 
should focus on the relationship of the association to the state. Where the 
state has decided to impose licensure requirements, it must provide direct 
supervision of the profession. This will provide the forum for review of 
any regulations imposed on such professionals that are likely to have any 
competitive effect. Essentially, any private association of members of 
that profession can advocate for specific controls or standards with the 
state agency adopting and enforcing such limits as are in the public 
interest.298 This also provides a forum for public comment and response 
to any such proposal. Where the profession lacks any state licensure or 
regulation, it seems very unlikely that there is a good case to respect its 
 
297. There is a real concern with unwise and excessive grants by states of authority to regulate 
leading to anticompetitive exploitation and exclusion. Control over such legislative grants requires 
a different legal strategy. See Carstensen, Where Is Attorney General Waldo, supra note 28, at 773 
(“Unchecked, these kinds of statutes, ordinances, and regulations undermine the welfare of the 
general public by both facilitating exploitation and by deterring entry by more efficient or 
innovative alternatives.”). 
298. Such regulations in fact are often excessive and unreasonable, but the solution to that 
problem lies in other legal doctrines. See id. at 813 (explaining that the state AGs should be the 
ones to survey judicial doctrines that could help avoid anticompetitive regulations). 
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efforts to control competition among its adherents or with other 
professions. Hence, absent very rare circumstances, it should be 
impossible for such groups to claim any right to regulate the practice of 
their activity.299 
The more difficult cases involve regulatory entities such as the NCAA 
and standard setting organizations that are national in character such that 
no state should have effective control and where Congress has not 
stepped forward with a regulatory scheme.300 These gaps in oversight do 
not remove the need for the development and enforcement of regulations. 
But they certainly complicate the process. In the standard setting context, 
OMB Circular A-119 provides concrete guidance about the process for 
creating regulations.301 All stakeholders must be able to participate, and 
the decisions require a consensus. This creates an open process, which 
should be both transparent and result in a balanced regulatory result. 
Moreover, there must be a means to have a disinterested review of both 
regulations and their implementation. 
Finally, it is important to separate out true ethical issues. These are not 
regulations, but difficult choices among permissible courses of conduct. 
In many situations, there can be various institutional participants as well 
as individual professionals who must collectively decide what course to 
pursue. In rejecting some courses and favoring others, there is a 
“restraint” on the freedom of the actor. In medicine or law, and perhaps 
even dentistry, these can be very difficult and morally wrenching choices. 
These are basically one-off decisions about specific challenges. They are 
not regulatory in character and should not be confused with the kinds of 
regulation at issue in the three dental cases. 
 
299. This is a context where certification may be more relevant. Customers may rely on that to 
select appropriate providers of a service. In such situations the question should be whether the 
denial of certification has competitive impact and, if so, whether it being denied without a valid 
justification. Cf. Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1984) (allowing 
the society to regulate the appraiser’s fees their members set). 
300. California has recently adopted legislation that would invalidate the NCAA’s prohibitions 
on compensation upheld in the O’Bannon case. Other state legislatures appear likely to join this 
revolt. The NCAA has signaled that it is prepared to retreat on this issue which would avoid a 
conflict over its regulatory rights, but this creates a serious risk that the states will eclipse its basic 
regulatory authority in ways that are likely to result in a “race to the bottom.” 
301. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-
119: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 4 (Jan. 27, 2016), available at 
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_01-22-2016.pdf (stating 
adherence to the standards of the circular is essential to the grant of a limited statutory protection 
for such organizations from antitrust treble damage liability provided by 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2018)). 
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CONCLUSION 
These cases all involve claims of the right of private groups to restrain 
and “regulate” competition. The CDA result conflicts with NCDB. Both 
entities sought to regulate competitive conduct affecting the dental 
profession. CDA was an SRO and got away with it. NCDB was a “state 
agency” and did not. But when IFD sought to protect the profession by 
denying non-dentists the right to review dentists’ decisions, this SRO was 
found to violate antitrust law. The decisions do not themselves provide a 
coherent framework to determine when and under what circumstances 
antitrust law will recognize authority to regulate competition in a 
profession. Worse, they confound the distinction between naked and 
ancillary restraints that is the foundation of a coherent antitrust 
framework. Absent some identifiable exemption for such cartelistic 
conduct, there is no rational way to explain the difference between these 
restraints and the ones that merit jail time! The open-ended “balancing” 
rhetoric of the standard description of the rule of reason leads to chaos. 
The rule provides no rule or even a predictable standard. It implies that 
any cartel can be lawful if it serves some ill-defined public interest. The 
fact that the courts have not adopted this balancing approach for cartel 
cases generally demonstrates that it is not a helpful framework for 
assessing naked restraints to determine when they might be exempt from 
antitrust law. 
The Carstensen-Roth framework of per se legality, in contrast, 
provides an explanation for the implicit model the FTC and courts have 
employed. This framework looks for (1) some form, tacit or express, of 
public authorization to regulate; (2) the consistency of this specific 
regulation with that authorization; and (3) whether the regulatory 
decision-making and implementation was consistent with appropriate 
process. This framework provides a principled and consistent method for 
assessing the validity of any claim for exemption from antitrust. 
Moreover, the cases are consistent with this model. Unfortunately, these 
decisions have not articulated that framework, and instead obfuscated the 
analysis with vague references to ethics and the special standing of the 
professions. As a result, contemporary antitrust does not provide useful 
guidance to any group seeking to establish its authority to regulate 
competition. The Carstensen-Roth framework, on the other hand, 
provides a method of analysis that will produce consistent, rational, and 
explicable results that serve the public interest in legitimate regulation. 
Since neither courts nor lawyers like novelty, it is understandable if 
advocates call the initial inquiry into whether a naked restraint has any 
authorization a “quick look” which would put the burden on the party 
defending the restraint to demonstrate such authorization. Where there is 
plausible authorization to regulate outside of conventional state action, 
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federal preemption, or constitutional bar—the resulting analysis can be 
cast as a determination of the “reasonableness” of the merits of the claims 
of regulatory authority, its application, and related process. Such an 
approach, consistent with the Carstensen-Roth per se legal approach, 
would focus on the validity of the regulatory claim. This “rule of reason” 
must not be conflated with that based on ancillary restraints or courts will 
again “set sail on the sea of doubt.” 
